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## CONCERNING MIRACLE

THE LATE

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Educated but uncritical thought finds the notion of miracle increasingly burdensome. Many reject it outright and others would gladly be rid of it. The current conception with such persons may be fairly described as follows: There is an order of nature from which it is hard, if not impossible, to show a departure. There may be apparent departures from the accustomed order, but they are always expressions of a deeper order and hence are natural. For instance, the freezing of water by the application of heat seems like a violation of the familiar laws of physics, but it is really an illustration. The science of today makes us familiar with many facts, which would once have been thought miraculous, but which we now see to be outcomes of law. Comets and eclipses were cases of this kind in the middle ages, and epidemics also were similarly regarded; but all of these things have been brought under the reign of law. The *aéroplane* and wireless telegraphy, and even the trolley car, would have been signs and wonders beyond ordinary thaumaturgy three hundred years ago, but they are not miraculous. The facts of witchcraft, faith healing, cures at shrines, were long denied because they seemed to affirm spiritual agencies of some sort; now we admit many of the alleged facts, but deny their supernatural character by including them under the head of hypnotism, suggestion, influence of mind on body, and so on. Considerations of this kind are making us increasingly hospitable to strange facts which once would have been thought miraculous, and increasingly indisposed

to admit their miraculous character. Thus the realm of nature and the realm of mystery are both extending, but the sphere of miracle seems to be approaching the vanishing-point.

The facts, as thus stated, appear decisive, but they are really vague and ambiguous. The true conclusion is that although the realm of law is growing, miracle is not excluded. The antithesis to law is not miracle, but disorder and chaos. Miracle in any religious sense implies a system from which a departure is made. It presupposes an established order and then assumes that God for some sufficient reason departs from it in such a way as to reveal his presence and purpose. The superficiality involved in opposing the reign of law to the fact of miracle is nothing less than pathetic in its irrelevancy, for the religious believer in miracles affirms the reign of law as much as anyone, but he also believes in a Creator and Administrator of this law and holds that this Creator may for good reasons depart from it.

Again, when we speak of the fixed order of nature we have a phrase of very uncertain meaning. It may mean the order of observable law on which we practically depend, and it may mean a system of absolute and universal determinism which denies all freedom and holds that all events in the universe, mental and physical alike, are the necessary resultants of their temporal antecedents according to inexorable laws. These two meanings are very different. The former is a harmless statement of what all admit, and the latter is a baseless and self-destructive dogmatism. It is no uncommon thing to find persons passing unwittingly from the former to the latter meaning under some such ambiguous phrase as "scientific method" or "the postulates of science." These phrases, as thus used, are arrant question-beggars, and usually cover an abyss of ignorance by a showy but baseless pretence of knowledge.

These considerations show that the question of miracle goes deeper than is commonly supposed and that it cannot be settled without recourse to philosophy. The debate can really proceed only on a theistic basis. Atheism could not deny the possibility of extraordinary happenings, but these would not be miracles but exceptions to law. They would be simply failing cases or faults in the accustomed order, and not indications of a supernatural



agency. They would be merely opaque facts of which we could make nothing. All systems of necessity, also, would be in the same condition. They would admit all manner of departures from the order, for we have no means of proving the observed order to be all-embracing and eternal. For all we can say, any number of departures from order might occur, but they would not be miraculous, they would be simply manifestations of the kaleidoscopic implications of the underlying power. Both of these views would logically reduce us to the baldest empiricism without the slightest warrant for expectation for the future or for surprise at whatever it might bring. It is only as we admit the existence of God that miracle in any intelligible sense is given, or that it has any practical importance. How, then, does the matter look from a theistic standpoint?

Historically the subject has been somewhat complicated by the use of miracles for the construction of technical evidences of Christianity, and the matter has been further confused by the deistic philosophy which has so largely ruled our thought. The actual difficulties mainly root in this deistic conception. On that view God made the world and set it going under the control of general laws, and since then he has rested from his cosmic labors, having no administrative function whatever in connection with the world of things. All events, then, that happen in this on-going are the products of these laws and as such are natural. A miracle on the other hand would be something that could not be accounted for by the laws of nature, but would be an interjection or interference from without by God. On this view God made a system which for the present runs itself, and anything that nature does is subtracted from his control. Thus we seem to have two agencies in the outer world, God and nature. Nature is the proximate agency, and God is needed, if at all, only to set nature going. Meanwhile nature runs its own mechanical course, producing a great variety of effects for which nature alone is responsible; and we must not think of referring anything to God until all the resources of nature are exhausted. So long as any natural cause can be found, or rather, until it can be shown that no natural cause can be found, we must not have recourse to a supernatural one. But as nature is ever growing

more vast and mysterious, it becomes practically impossible, it would seem, to demonstrate any event to be supernatural. Thus, beginning with belief in God, we tend by our absentee conception of him and by our thought of a self-running nature to make God less and less necessary, and even to return to atheism. In all this the underlying thought is that all events are natural and therefore undivine; that is, they represent no divine purpose or meaning. Only that is divine which is anomalous and unaccountable, and as the realm of the anomalous is growing less the realm of God is correspondingly decreasing. This inversion of all good sense is one of the standing features of the debate.

Before proceeding to the decisive criticism of this view, we may point out that so long as it believes in God at all it is inconsistent with its own principles. For if there was a divine purpose at the beginning, it must have embraced all its implications, so as to leave no place for mere by-products and unintended happenings in the system. Such a fancy would be a crude extension to God of our relation to our machines which are only to a small extent in our own power. If, then, we regard nature as an impersonal mechanism, we must say that the creative act implied all its products forevermore, even to the minutest details and most remote effects. For mechanism can only unfold its implications. There is a fancy in uncritical thought that mechanism can do a great many unintended things which were not originally implied in it. This is the fallacy of the class term. Our thinking is largely symbolic and short-hand, and thus we produce various simple conceptions which apply to a great many things without implying any of them. In the same way, when we think of the cosmic mechanism, we form such abstractions as matter and force, in which none of the details or particulars of the system are mentioned, and then we think that these two abstractions are capable by themselves of producing and maintaining the cosmic order. But as soon as we come to think concretely and exhaustively, we see that mechanism can make no new departures or produce factors and events not originally provided for. The world is not merely a system of general laws; it is also a great multitude of individuals and detailed happenings. Indeed this multitude is the concrete fact and the general laws are only our



abstractions from concrete things and happenings. They apply to the things, but they do not imply them. Now the creative act in such a system implies the whole set of consequences,—not merely general laws, but the concrete multitude of things to the remotest detail. If anything had not been provided for in the creative act, the thing would not have occurred, and, conversely, if the thing was to occur, it must have been provided for in the creative act. We must hold, then, that God in creating intended all that creation implies, for we can hardly suppose that he did not know what he was doing or that he could not help himself. Hence, if we allow nature to be at present a real mechanical system, we have no occasion to be religiously disturbed thereat as if it were a rival to God, for such nature could never do anything but what it was determined by its constitution to do; and there is nothing to forbid the thought that it may have been determined to work in human service and for the realization of the divine purpose. In that case mechanism would only be the instrument by which the purpose is realized.

At one time the view which made God and nature different and somewhat antithetical powers seemed fairly clear and, moreover, difficult to escape. In fact, however, progress in philosophical thinking of recent years has greatly modified the whole matter so as to give the discussion a very different form. The doctrine of the Divine Immanence, which is now so generally held in the higher speculative circles, is fast displacing the conception of nature as anything substantial and self-administering, and reducing it to the phenomenal form of the divine causality. Nature is nothing in itself and of course it does nothing of itself. Things and events hang together or come about in certain ways, but the ground and cause of them all must be found beyond them. Nature expresses an order of change, but never reveals its causal source. In this respect it is something like a series of sounds, as in a piece of music. The relation of the various notes might be described in their coexistences and sequences, but there would be no causality in them, and no passing up and down the tone series would ever reveal the causality. Causality is apart from the series in the composer and performer. In the same way the study of the natural order has led to a distinction between the space

and time world which can be presented to the senses, and the power world which is forever out of sight, the invisible ground of the spatial and temporal order. The space and time world, then, is regarded as an effect like the series of tones, and also like that series it has its causality outside itself. In that case nature as a system of spatial and temporal phenomena is but the continuous product of the invisible power or energy on which it forever depends. And as we regard that power as divine, we have to say that the entire system abuts upon and continually proceeds from the divine will. God is no absentee, but is rather the changeless power by which all things exist and by which all things stand or go. This is the view which is fast becoming universal in the philosophical world. Deism is dead; we must have a living and immanent God or none.

With this result, nature loses its substantial character and becomes simply God's continuous deed. It is throughout supernatural in its causality. All cosmic causality is divine. The most familiar event proceeds as directly from the divine will as the most extraordinary and miraculous. But the supernatural cause is orderly, that is natural, in its manifestations; and thus we come to the conception of a supernatural natural,—that is, a natural which forever roots in the supernatural; and a natural supernatural,—that is, a supernatural that proceeds in orderly and uniform ways. But whatever happens, be it the maintenance of the familiar routine or miraculous departure from it, happens not of itself or because of some inexorable and self-executing law or system, but because in the divine purpose and wisdom that is the thing demanded; and in all events alike God is equally present and equally near.

This result can be securely maintained on the basis of philosophic reflection. Nature is no longer a rival of God, but simply the form under which the divine will proceeds in its cosmic outgo. With this result we have almost all that religion really aims at in its insistence upon miracle. Religion seeks after God. It longs to find the Father and to know that he is near. But proceeding on naturalistic and deistic assumptions, we build up the phantom of nature which petrifies man's higher life, and then we look anxiously for breaks in the natural order and pin our faith on



miracles, mainly physical, as the sole indication of God's presence, if not of God's existence. But with the conception of a supernatural natural we can breathe freely even in the face of the natural order, and are much less concerned about miracle in the sense of a departure from natural law. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural in that case would not lie in the causality, but in the phenomenal relations. The causality would be equally supernatural in both. The natural and miraculous would be equally products of the divine will, but in the case of miracle there would be a departure from the familiar order so as to indicate to believers a divine presence and meaning. Miracles in themselves would be no more divinely wrought than any routine event. The only place or function we could find for them would be as signs of a divine power and purpose which men immersed in sense could not find in the ordinary course of the natural. They might be condescensions to human weakness, but they would root no more intimately in the divine will and purpose than the most familiar events. If this conception of the supernatural be allowed, the question of miracle loses much of its importance religiously and otherwise, for, as we have said, religion has interest only in finding God and has insisted so strenuously upon miracle because its deistic philosophy left no other way to find him.

In the traditional debates on this subject very little attention has been given to defining miracle so as clearly to indicate its character. There has been a strong tendency on the part of believers so to define miracle as to limit it to the original signs necessary for the establishment of the Christian faith, and Protestant theologians have largely taken this view. In this way they thought to reject the miracles of the Catholic church and also to secure material for the construction of evidences of Christianity. Frequently their definitions were made strictly with this aim. Thus a distinguished theologian of the last generation defined a miracle as

(1) An event occurring in the physical world capable of being discerned and discriminated by the bodily senses of human witnesses;

(2) Of such a character that it can be rationally referred to no other cause than the immediate volition of God;

(3) Accompanying a religious teacher and designed to authenticate his divine commission and the truth of his message.

Accordingly, writers of this class were not willing to allow that answers to prayer or special providences and the like were to be viewed as miraculous. Scientific writers, on the other hand, defined miracles as any departure from the order of nature such that the continuity of nature is in some degree broken, no matter how large or small the fracture may be. Hence they held stoutly to continuity and regarded any consideration of the size of the miracle as a kind of logical shilly-shallying which could not be too strongly condemned. Every event must be looked upon as the result of its antecedents, and special providences and answers to prayers involved miracle just as much as the most striking event. Here the assumption of an absolute determinism clearly appears.

Professor Tyndall, who was one of the ablest supporters of the naturalistic position, had considerable argument with Canon Mozley on this point. In his paper on "Prayer and Natural Law" he says that the notion of natural law is displacing the belief in volition. "One by one natural phenomena have been associated with their proximate causes and the idea of direct personal volition mixing itself with the economy of nature is retreating more and more." As to any effect of prayer on physical conditions, he rejects it. He tells of a young priest who came up every year to a town in Switzerland to "bless the mountains." "Year by year the Highest was entreated by official intercessions to make such meteorological arrangements as would insure food and shelter for the flocks and herds of the Valaisians." But Professor Tyndall regarded this as altogether unpermissible. "The Italian wind gliding over the crest of the Matterhorn is as firmly ruled as the earth in its orbital revolution around the sun, and the fall of its vapor into clouds is exactly as much a matter of necessity as the return of the seasons. The dissipation, therefore, of the slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal would be as much a miracle as the rolling of the Rhone over the Grimsel precipices and down Haslithal to Brienz." (*Fragments of Science*, p. 39.) The same thought was continued by Professor Tyndall in the next paper on "Miracles and Special Provi-



dences," in which he argues that Mozley's distinction of the two is untenable. Here special providences are declared to be miracles, in that they imply a result which was not due to their natural antecedents, and, as miracles are not to be allowed, special providences, answers to prayer, etc., at least in the physical realm, must go with them. He adds: "She [science] does assert for example that without a disturbance of natural law quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a single beam of the sun" (p. 39).

Here Professor Tyndall is strenuous for a continuity of natural law, and tacitly assumes that the antecedent physical conditions fully determine the consequent physical effect. However, this view is by no means self-evident when we recall the distinction already made between the space and time world and the world of power. In the space and time world we can now and then trace an antecedent into its consequent, but only when it is a case of the composition of motions as in kinematics. If a body is moving and is not interfered with, provided we know its rate and direction, we can tell where it will be at any later time, and if two or more bodies are moving together, it would be possible to compound their motions into a resultant motion. But this is possible only to a very slight extent in dealing with the actual changes of the physical world, as those changes are not due to antecedent movements alone, but to those movements plus some determination from the world of power. For example, in a period of dispersed matter under the influence of gravitation we could trace the condensation of the matter into smaller volume, but when the elements came near enough together to allow of chemical action, we should then have a change that could not be referred to the antecedent conditions of things, but which would be a manifestation of a hitherto unmanifested property of the elements, namely chemical affinity. Kinematic deduction here would find a break of continuity due to the manifestation of a new force. Again, we might conceive a world of diffused oxygen and hydrogen, and this world and its phenomena could be traced a certain way by our knowledge of the laws of gases; but

if a spark should pass through such a world, there would be a new manifestation of which the original state of things would give no hint. The elements would combine into the water-molecule and appear as water-vapor, and this again would suffer another break of continuity when it was condensed into water, and this in turn would once more transgress the law of continuity when it became solid as ice. Thus we see that in the actual physical world of experience we have repeated breaks of continuity due to the fact that the power world is continually manifesting itself in new departures. The phenomenal world, that is the observable world in space and time, is perpetually subject to irruptions from the power world. Ordinarily, we seek to reinstate the endangered continuity by gathering up these various forces into the notion of "the nature of things," without observing that of this "nature" we have absolutely no experience, and that it is simply an invisible and hypothetical metaphysical support for the series of changes in experience.

And here it must be pointed out that while it is perfectly clear that there is causality in the case, the nature and location of that causality are by no means plain. We might possibly seek to locate it in the form of central forces in the invisible metaphysical elements, or we might locate it in one all-embracing energy from which the course of nature forever proceeds, or by which that course is forever administered. We have here a metaphysical question of no small difficulty and one which cannot be settled by any observation or by off-hand thinking of any sort. Professor Tyndall in the passages quoted expressed the conviction that there is necessity in the case, and claims that we know we are dealing with necessary forces. To this the answer must be that no one knows anything of the kind. The forces, whatever they may be, are not open to observation, and their nature must be found by critical reflection. There is indeed an order in experience which, so far as we are concerned, is fixed, and which on that account we may call necessary, but of the necessity or non-necessity of the causality at work we know directly nothing. All that we discern in such cases is a certain uniformity in change upon which we can rely in experience, but of how the uniformity is produced no one has the slightest knowledge by inductive ob-



ervation. This notion of necessity is one of the most specious and baseless of all the illusions that have misled speculative thought. There is a general assumption that the alternative is chaos or at least arbitrariness and caprice, whereas the fact might well be uniformity administered by free intelligence.

In one of the passages quoted from Professor Tyndall there is the suggestion, of continual recurrence in the literature of this debate, that the existence of these natural laws excludes the conception of any special volition entering into the order of nature. And to this the answer is, there is nothing whatever in the conception of volition which forbids that it should be rational and consistent. It is entirely conceivable that a supreme intelligence should administer the order of the world in uniform fashion for the securing of its own ends; and indeed, when we think the matter out, it appears that free intelligence is the only real basis of uniformity we can find. Necessity becomes such a basis only by assuming that it must be uniform, in which case all possibility of change would be excluded. As to the difficulty involved in the notion of special volition, that is merely a confusion arising from not understanding the relation between the universal and the particulars subsumed under it. Both volition and law in general are nothing in the concrete, and in order to effect anything whatever in the concrete world each must be specialized into particular form in application. A volition that was not a special volition of some particular thing would be an empty abstraction.

So, then, the space and time world remains open to observation. We may study its coexistences and sequences and find certain uniformities on which we can practically rely. This can be known apart from any metaphysics whatever, but when it comes to deciding the nature of the back-lying forces, we have a speculative problem which must be handed over to philosophy for solution. Moreover the experienced order, from which all our real knowledge must proceed, is by no means the hard-and-fast thing closed against all modification that the abstract theorist assumes it to be. Experience gives abundant illustration of the compatibility of law and purpose in the physical world. When we consider the relation of man to the system of general laws, we find that he

can use it for the production of a great variety of effects which the laws left to themselves would never produce. General laws, like those of gravitation or heat or electricity, would never weave a yard of cotton or make a steam-engine or drive a trolley-car. These laws and forces are continually receiving specific direction and application from human volition, which is ever playing into the physical system and producing a multitude of effects which could not be traced to antecedent physical conditions but only to human thought and purpose. A series of beings, for instance, speculative and scientific microbes, ignorant of human personality, and unable to find it among their objects, might study the order of physical nature on the supposition that physical antecedents determine all physical consequents, conclude that human personality is an altogether impossible notion, and reject as unscientific the thought that human purpose counts for anything in the on-going of the world. They might even wax eloquent and peremptory over "scientific method," the "continuity of natural law," and the general havoc that would be wrought in microbic science by such an admission, and their talk would not be unlike that of some human speculators. But, in spite of these rhetorical shudders and alarms, the error of their "postulates" is manifest. In fact, if there were any positive reason for thinking that a multitude of wills, supernal and infernal, are playing into our system, science could say nothing against it. And if such control of nature is possible to man, in spite of general laws, there seems to be no good reason why it should be impossible with God. Indeed Professor Tyndall in his paper explaining his famous prayer-test proposition admitted that as man can work through the system and produce multitudinous effects without breaking any general laws, it is possible that God also should do the same. But he did not always bear this in mind. When he was arguing with Canon Mozley, he was sure that physical effects must always be traced to physical antecedents only.

On account of this fact that man is continually modifying the system so as to produce faults in any purely physical deduction, Dr. Bushnell in his work, *Nature and the Supernatural*, characterized all human action as miraculous, so far as the physical system is concerned. It is something that cannot be deduced



from that system and can only be looked upon as a modification from without. The general order of law is indeed maintained, but the loom weaves a different pattern as the threads are manipulated by the unseen human spirit. There seems, then, not to be the slightest reason for doubting that God may produce a great many effects, not against general laws, but through them or in accordance with them; and those effects would be quite as specially created and specially willed as though they had been dropped out of the skies by fiat. They would be no more specifically designed or specifically created in the latter case than in the former. If it be said that in this case there would nevertheless be a point where the antecedents have a different consequent because of this supernatural determination, the answer would be that the same fact must be found in all human control of the system. Our human activity in what we call nature is of course chiefly directive. We do not produce the forces of the system, but we do direct them and determine their effects. In this way we control nature. But in order to accomplish this there must be a point, say in the nervous system, where some motion is initiated that is not the outcome of antecedent states of the nervous system, but due to the interaction of the invisible mind with the organism. To be sure, some persons of rigor and vigor have thought this would never do, and have preferred to hold that consciousness itself has nothing to do with the control of our bodies and with the various other physical changes thence resulting. But this reduces the theory to absurdity, implying, as it does, that the whole series of physical movements whereby the human mind has manifested itself in its historic and social life has gone on without any origin in, or control by, thought.

The physicists have been inclined to content themselves with eliminating miracle from the physical realm, leaving it undecided whether it might not be allowed in the mental realm. Physical miracle, we think, is unconditionally to be rejected, but psychological miracle may perhaps be admitted. Such a view aids the imagination a little. A psychological miracle involves no such seeming waste of energy as rolling the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, and therefore is not so great a shock to our ideas of law. It is curious how the size of a miracle comes into our thought

of the subject. Not infrequently it has been suggested that certain miracles, say the stopping of the earth in its rotation upon its axis, are impossible, because then the seas would rush over the land and drown out the continents, the idea apparently being that if God wrought a miracle of such size, he would not be equal to looking after all the details and might possibly wreck the physical system if he meddled. But the thorough-going, thick-and-thin rejecter of miracles will not allow any such half-way work as the admission of psychological miracle involves. He extends the realm of law into mind and society also, and insists on continuity until everything, physical and mental alike, is bound up in a rigid scheme of necessity, so that consequents succeed their antecedents everywhere with invariable uniformity. But here, too, we meet the same fact already mentioned. The reign of law may be universal, but it is subordinate. In some sense the laws of mind are continuous and we could not dispense with them, but in themselves they secure nothing. As we said of physical laws, they apply to all events in their realm, but they do not imply them. The law of gravitation runs a water wheel, but does not make it. The laws of physical nature are omnipresent in the human control of nature, but that control secures results which the laws of themselves would never reach. Similarly, the laws of mind are in some sense inviolable. They must be regarded in education, in society, in governmental action, and even in self-control, but in themselves they do not imply the results we reach through them. Here, also, we find, as in the outer world, an order of law at the service of intelligence, an order through which we work our will. We may, then, maintain at once the inviolability of law and its subordinate character, so that freedom may manifest itself through the law and not against it, yet in such a way that the results shall be as distinctly an outcome of purpose as they would be if produced by fiat. If we reject this general conception in favor of a universal determinism, then we have no longer a scientific doctrine based on experience and induction, but a dogmatic speculation which is the outcome of superficial reflection, and which overturns reason itself.

In some sense, then, we are in the midst of miracles all the time. As having a supernatural root, all things are miracles. Birth and



life and death, the springing of the grass, the growing of the flowers, the ripening of the harvest, the march of the seasons, and the shining of the stars, all are miracles in the sense that they alike root in the ever-living, ever-working will of God. They are also miracles in the sense that they cannot be deduced in their successive phases from antecedent conditions, but continually proceed from the activity of the Divine. They can be as little deduced from antecedents as the successive phases in a musical composition can be deduced from the antecedent ones, but they all continually depend upon a causality which is not in the series, but which produces and maintains it in due order and sequence. At the same time these things are natural in the sense that an order may be discerned in them on which we can practically depend. But this order is not to be extended into a dogmatic finality. These laws must always be restricted, as Mr. Mill has said, to a "reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases." We must remember what a scanty insight we have into so-called natural laws and how limited is our scope at best. All that we really experience is a certain uniformity within narrow spatial and temporal limits,—that is, narrow in relation to the infinitude of possible existence. We cannot found these uniformities upon any necessity of reason, neither can we establish them as all-embracing even in space and time. We cannot say with any security that they constitute anything more than a limited order on which we can practically depend in the sphere of our present experience, and even here we discover a great deal that we are unable to reduce to order. There is very much that resembles weather in our cosmic experience. The weather may indeed be subject to law, but nevertheless its laws are so imperfectly known to us that we regard it as one of the symbols of inconstancy. Now when we take long stretches of time and great ranges of space, for all we know, the whole order of nature, so-called, might be a species of cosmic weather with little uniformities here and there, and now and then, but never to be extended so as to become all-embracing necessities. If we should have a series of students of nature among very short-lived beings, some might report that it was always winter and some that it was always summer. Others might report that it is always day and still

others that it is always night. They could easily find these little uniformities in their experience, but if they extended them to take in all the possibilities of the world, they would certainly be very much mistaken.

Considered, then, as a speculative proposition, the difficulty is less to establish the possibility of miracle than to prove the necessary uniformity and universality of law. It is an altogether possible proposition that experience does not admit of being reduced to an all-embracing uniformity, or that uniformity and non-uniformity divide the field of experience between them. It is an equally possible proposition that the uniformities in our experience are relative to ourselves and even transitory in their validity. But these high considerations belong to the deeper problems of knowledge. We descend then from these heights and are met by the question, Is it not the clearest dictate of science that we are never to look for supernatural causes until we have exhausted the natural ones? Is not science itself compelled to exclude all miracle and all supernaturalism? Some truth, but more confusion, appears in these questions. The realm of science as a study of the uniformities of experience is confounded with the question of causality, which belongs to philosophy. Certainly science is not compelled to eliminate miracle in the sense of a cause outside the phenomenal series, any more than it is compelled to exclude man from all control of the physical series. Science is compelled to exclude miracle in the same sense that our hypothetical physicists among the microbes would be compelled to exclude man from the causal factors of the universe. The space and time order we have seen to be subject to continual irruptions from the invisible world of power. In this space and time order we admit no supernatural causes for the reason that we admit no causes of any sort. All we aim to do in this field is to arrange the events in groups and rows according to their observed spatial and temporal relations, and for this we need no assistance from metaphysics in any form, natural or supernatural. Science, as thus understood, is entirely neutral to the question of freedom or necessity, natural or supernatural. The continuity of law can be maintained along with complete openness to purpose. But when we affirm natural causes in any other sense than



that of observed phenomenal antecedents, we are really talking obsolete metaphysics, not science. Certainly we must look only for natural causes in the phenomenal world, but such causes are not causes at all; only uniformities of phenomenal relation. Science, then, never tells us what is possible or not possible in reality, but only how things hang together in experience. Whenever it assumes to do more than this it is no longer science, but dogmatism. As to what science can recognize or not recognize, or what scientific method requires, it is plain that any conception of science that does not permit it to recognize any fact whatever ignores the very first aim of all thinking, namely, to know the facts. The microbes in that gas or water world could have dogmatized with equal profundity and justice about the possible and the impossible.

So much for general laws themselves, supposing them to exist. For us of course they do exist as orders of being and happening to which we must adjust ourselves. In so far they constitute a datum for us. They are not indeed much of a limitation even for us, as we are able to use them, and we should not be able to do without them. But God himself as the absolute source of all finite being is bound by nothing but his own wisdom and goodness. What they dictate, that he does. If they call for uniformity, there is uniformity. If they call for change, there is change. God never acts against nature because for him there is no nature to act against. His purpose, founded in his wisdom and goodness, is alone law-giving for his action, and all else, whatever it may be, is but the expression of that purpose. Nature conceived as a barrier to God, or as anything with which God must reckon, is a pure fiction, a product of unclear thought which has lost itself in dogmatic abstractions. From the standpoint of the Divine, then, there are no "interventions," "interruptions," "interferences," and that sort of thing. There is simply the continual working of the Divine Will to realize the divine purpose.

We may sum up the results thus far reached in the affirmation of the universality of law, and also its subordination. There is, indeed, considerable faith in admitting such universality, but still the general tendency of thought is to this affirmation. At the same time, as we have seen, the system of law as anything ex-

perienced is entirely compatible with the equal universality of purpose so that law serves as the form under which purpose realizes itself; and when we come to the question of causality, we have to affirm a universal supernaturalism, not indeed a disorderly, capricious, and chaotic supernaturalism, but one which proceeds by orderly methods and in consistent ways. The attempt to construe the world of power in mechanical terms critical reflection clearly shows to be impossible. It commits us to barren tautologies and endless regresses, and when made universally brings reason itself to hopeless bankruptcy. We have now to inquire how this universal supernaturalism bears on the question of miracle.

It is plain that this conception of the immanence of God in all cosmic on-going deprives the question of miracle as a departure from the natural order of very much of its importance. As we have before said, the great interest of religion in miracle has been due to the current deistic philosophy, according to which miracles seem to be the only way of finding God and the only way in which God could manifest his living presence. This interest in miracle is set aside by our insight into the fact of the supernatural character of the causality of the world, for now, instead of finding God with difficulty anywhere, we are permitted to find him everywhere. All of those arguments against miracle based upon anti-religious grudges are also set aside by the insight into this universal supernaturalism. There is no longer any division of labor between nature and God, as if nature did the bulk of the work of the world and God came in to do the rest when nature proved inadequate. There is rather, and only, an orderly working of the divine in all things, miraculous and non-miraculous alike, and the only place which could be found for miracle in this view would be, as already said, as a sign to call the attention of men who were immersed in sense to a divine presence and meaning which it is important they should discern and which they would otherwise miss.

In the traditional discussion of this subject the miraculous and the supernatural have not been distinguished but have been treated as identical. They must, however, be distinguished. The result of our study thus far is to affirm a universal supernatural, but we have not touched the question of technical miracle,

in the sense of a manifest departure from experienced law. This question we have now to consider.

From the standpoint of theism the order of law first becomes a rational thing and furnishes ground for rational expectation. For the theist, too, there is a decided presumption against miracles, at least of the striking sort, and the presumption arises from the nature of intelligence itself. But this debate can lead to no result when abstractly taken, for then it becomes a shuffling of abstract notions which make no connection with real life. Thus Hume's argument against miracles was little more than an academic puzzle or riddle, and he recanted it by his own admissions. After opposing uniform experience to testimony and concluding that the balance must always be in favor of experience, he limits the statement by saying "that a miracle can never be proved so as to be a foundation of a system of religion, for I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature of such a kind as to admit a proof from testimony." On the other hand believers have held that testimony could prove anything. One has only to pile up the testimony long enough to have it overcome all opposition. But this, too, is academic. Abstract and unrelated wonders might conceivably be proved by abstract testimony, but such suggestions have no concrete value. If these wonders happened or did not happen we should be equally indifferent, and however much evidence might be offered for them, they would inevitably fade out of rational belief until at last no one would take the pains even to deny them. In a rational system miracles without moral meaning and religious bearing would have as little credibility as the stories of Jack the Giant Killer and Aladdin's lamp. We should not believe them, we should not even disbelieve them, we should ignore them. For the theist the presumption against any showy thaumaturgy is so strong that he rejects it at once. Some adequate reason for miracle must be shown to secure it any consideration. And in deciding what is an adequate reason the personal equation will turn the scale. If we are irreligious in our disposition, and think that the supreme and only sacred thing, of course there will be no faith in miracle. But if, on the other hand, we believe that God's deepest purpose in our life is a moral



and spiritual one, and also believe that we are continually in the hands of God who is seeking to build us into his spiritual children, we shall not be hostile to any conception of miracle that fits into this view. The miracles that may have been necessary in the earlier times of ignorance to introduce a new order of thought and life will not necessarily disturb us; and all those facts of prayer and spiritual communion which point to the continual rooting of the inner life in God will be accepted as a matter of course. These, however, will never admit of anything approaching demonstration. The miracles of Biblical history are at best too far away to make any strong impression on us today, apart from their connection with the Christian system in which we already believe. And the touch of God in the inner life will always be more of a secret to the believing soul than a thing that could be put into a psychological court and cross-examined. Here, as said, the personal equation and the general impression made by the religious history of our race will decide our historical faith or unfaith, while for the inner life of the individual only the soul's own experience can be final. Our general world-view, our sense of fundamental and eternal values, our own most sacred and secret life, are determinate here. It is more than idle to refer these questions to a committee of chemists or other worthy people to decide.

It is altogether credible that in the early stages of human development, when both knowledge and religion were very crude, God found his way more directly through signs and wonders to the human mind than is necessary today. That which was needed was to guide men on the upward road, not to satisfy a committee of Sadducees. Such condescension to human weakness would not have been unworthy of God. Indeed from a pedagogical standpoint it is not easy to see how humanity could well have been started in any other way. In our own times God's pedagogical methods have changed. We are able to see God in his works, and our intellect has been developed so that we no longer need the kindergarten methods of the early years of our race. For us there is no objection to finding God in prodigies, if there be such things nowadays, but it is far more important to find him in the normal life of man and the unfoldings of history. Prodigies are vanishing quantities in any case, compared with

the historic life and development of humanity. Here alone does the divine presence have abiding and universal significance. It is religious illiteracy to seek God only or mainly anywhere else. That is to overlook the moral and religious aim of the whole human movement, and to degrade God to a mere thaumaturgist or sleight-of-hand performer. Physical miracles in any case are instrumental only and have their use in what they help us to. But the end of it all is the knowledge of God and spiritual likeness to him. The slow moralization of life and society, the enlightenment of conscience and its growing empire, the deepening sense of responsibility for the good order of the world and the well-being of men, the gradual putting away of old wrongs and foul diseases and blinding superstitions, these are the great proofs of God in history and life; in comparison with these all physical miracles sink into insignificance, and except as related to these higher interests have no value whatever. For us, then, the physical miracle is becoming less and less important and the spiritual miracle of the redeemed and transformed life, redeemed and transformed society, the spread of reason and righteousness in the earth, are the perennial miracles always possible and ever to be insisted upon.

For the sake, however, of those who may be disturbed over alleged physical miracle, say that of the resurrection of Jesus, I quote a passage from my work *The Immanence of God* which may be worthy of consideration by both parties:

When we ask what is real and what unreal in objective knowledge we commonly fall back on sense perception as the sole mark of reality. That is real which is there for the sense of all, and all else is illusion. For the routine life of everyday fact this test is all-sufficient, but it becomes very doubtful when made absolute and universal. There is not the slightest speculative warrant for saying that the range of perception must be the same in all. If there were persons otherwise sane and normal who professed an awareness of things beyond the common sense-range we should have no good reason for questioning the fact. There might be visions and voices for the spirit and in the spirit beyond all common seeing and hearing, and they might carry with them the same conviction of independent reality that we have in our common sense life. Or, since voice and vision are too suggestive of sense organs, let us say that there might be a spiritual awareness of reality beyond sense, which would

be a revelation that could never be judged or tested by sense. The conditions of such perception might also be a certain preparedness of spirit, as the sea can reflect the heavens above it only when its waters are at peace. But the gist and test of all perception is the conviction of reality that accompanies it. This can never be deduced from anything else or referred to anything else, and if there were such awareness of things beyond sense, it could be described only in sense terms and would thus be liable to misunderstanding. We should try to judge it by sense when it might transcend sense altogether. Reflections of this sort might lead both the believer and the unbeliever to see that the sense test is not certainly final.

We might apply these considerations to the miracle of the resurrection, a miracle without which not much of the Christian faith would be left, and one having which we can dispense with most of the rest. The thing that was essential was that the disciples should be convinced that their Lord still lived and that in his glorified existence he was still their Master and the head of his Kingdom. This was secured by what we call his resurrection and ascension, and it is really indifferent whether these constituted a fact which the Sadducees could have perceived, had they been in the neighborhood, or not. The important thing is that the minds of the disciples were so impressed with the fact that it became the corner-stone of their faith and of the Christian Church. How this was done does not matter much, provided it was done, and the miracle was equally great in any case.

Thus we have seen how complicated the question of miracle really is, and what deep root it has in our philosophy and our religious conceptions of the meaning of life and the world. It is infantile to suppose that science can prove or disprove this faith. If the Christian life be strong within us, and if the devils of greed and pride and selfishness are now being cast out, we shall not be very seriously disturbed by the stories of ancient miracle. And on the other hand if these spiritual miracles are not being wrought today, it will matter very little what happened two thousand years ago.

In the past this debate was carried on chiefly between religion and irreligion, but now it is going on to some extent among believers themselves. For them a double warning seems to be



in place. On the one hand, we must bear in mind the distinction between the supernatural and the miraculous. The former can be maintained against all adversaries, and this is the thing of chief importance. Signs and wonders, as we have said, are only means to an end in any case, and their function today is practically ended. We have come into a better stage of religious development, where we no longer need them, and where they may easily be a hindrance to faith rather than an aid. One can but sympathize, therefore, with those who wish to emphasize the fact of law in all life, as the condition of mental and spiritual soundness and sanity. They insist that all religious growth must depend on using the means that God has placed in our power instead of hoping that the laws of mental and spiritual life may be set aside. This fact cannot be too strongly urged, but it must be done with wisdom. When we reject miracle, we must make it clear that we do not mean to reject God and the supernatural, but only the thaumaturgic. We should look well to the scope of our language and the drift of our logic. There is much of the old rationalistic dogmatism masquerading as science and pursuing its old trade of undermining the higher faiths of humanity, and we must be careful not to aid it by using its specious but treacherous phrases. It is well to remember that nothing is gained for religion by minimizing its supernatural claims. The just claims of science can be fully recognized without infringing on the equally just claims of faith. We should also deal with the subject from the Christian point of view and the central Christian conceptions. Matters of detail decide nothing, whether for attack or defence. One who holds the central, the supreme, the stupendous miracle of the incarnation of the Son of God could hardly fail to see that the resurrection and ascension are an integral part of it, and he will not much concern himself about the withered fig-tree or the fish with the coin in its mouth. As for the Sadducees, I have spent much time with them and doubt if they can be convinced, and I am not even sure that they wish to be convinced. The Gospel was not made for Sadducees and professional doubters, but for men and women as they have been and are, weary and heavy-laden and in great need of finding God, and quite unable to find him in ways that would satisfy the critic. Something had

to be done for these people, and really that something has proved more effective than any of the improvements that have been offered. But both these terms, miracle and supernatural, have become so infected with unpleasant associations that we should do better to drop them altogether, and talk rather about God and set about doing his will in the full faith that our times are in his hands and that he is working in us and for us to will and to do of his good pleasure. We are not in a machine world, but in God's world, in a world of persons with God, the supreme person, at the head. And in such a world it is permitted to see visions and dream dreams, and to keep the soul open to the heavenly vision. To some Sadducees this will always be a stumbling-block, to others foolishness, and life must answer them. Perhaps it may still be true that some things are revealed to babes which are hidden from the wise and prudent. But if the Sadducee will continue this discussion, he should learn that philosophy has progressed since his traditional arguments were fashioned, so that they are now largely obsolete. He must carry the matter deeper and treat it more systematically, if he would reach any results worthy of consideration. It might also be well for him to master the difference between science, as the fruitful study of the order of experience, to which we owe so much, and "Science," that product of crude dogmatism and great question-begging term of the half-educated and hearsay thinker.

*THE THEOLOGY OF WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE<sup>1</sup>*

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Fifteen years ago there appeared a volume of some four hundred pages, which bore the modest title, *An Outline of Christian Theology*. It had originally been prepared by the author, a professor in Hamilton Theological Seminary, for the use of his seminary classes, and, after circulating for some time in the form of typewritten notes, was privately printed for the greater convenience of the users. No attempt was made to advertise the book, but in due time it found its way into the hands of one and another who was interested in theological questions, and when in 1898 it was issued by the author through the ordinary channels, it received from the public an instant and hearty welcome.

Three qualities explain the success of Dr. Clarke's theology. In the first place, it was written in a clear and simple style. Technical theological terms were as far as possible avoided. While it gave evidence of wide and careful reading, there was no parade of learning. The author was evidently concerned to tell his story in the most direct fashion possible, and content to rely for his appeal upon the inherent interest of his subject-matter.

The spirit in which the book was written was moreover one of singular serenity. The author approached the vexed questions of theology with a quiet confidence which at once disarmed criticism and allayed fear. He contemplated the changes wrought in our view of the world by modern science with calmness, as if they were a matter of course. He was untroubled by biblical criticism. The theory of evolution was accepted without question; the traditional eschatology so courteously dismissed that one scarcely realized that it was gone. Where many writers, like the chief captain in Acts, had obtained their freedom with a great

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Doctrine of God*, by William Newton Clarke, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1909.



price, Dr. Clarke wrote as one free born. He seemed as much at home spiritually in the modern world as he had been when a boy in his father's house.

And yet he was none the less Christian. Indeed, the striking thing about the book was its militant and aggressive Christianity. The author was evidently one who had communed deeply with Jesus, and had drawn from his communion convictions which had so laid hold upon his spirit as to demand utterance. He believed that the Gospel of Christ was a message which the world had not yet outgrown, and it was his endeavor to justify this faith by showing its adaptation to the present needs and problems of men.

A book which presents a positive message in a form which is at once lucid and convincing is sure to find readers, but these qualities alone would not have explained the success of Dr. Clarke's theology. It appeared at an opportune time and met a want which was widely felt by laymen as well as by ministers. Many who had broken intellectually with the doctrinal statements of the past still felt themselves at home emotionally in the religious values which they sought to express, and they welcomed this new statement of old truths because it made it possible for them to preserve their continuity with the Christian past, without the sacrifice of intellectual consistency. This fact gave the book a representative character. It was an index registering the presence of deep currents in the religious life of our time, and, as such, it deserves the attention of all who are interested in the study of contemporary religion.

In the present article we propose to review Dr. Clarke's theology with a view to discovering wherein its representative character consists. We shall take for the basis of our discussion his most recent book, the *Christian Doctrine of God*. In this closely printed octavo of some four hundred and seventy-five pages, he gives a systematic exposition of the fundamental principles of his theology. The same qualities which we noted in his earlier work reappear here. The book is at once lucid, modern, and Christian, but the treatment is fuller, and the reasoning more rigorous. Much that the earlier discussion implied is here fully developed. More than one untenable position has been abandoned. No recent book by an English-speaking theologian

reveals more clearly the prevailing tendency and controlling spirit of modern theological thought.

The aim which the author sets himself can be stated very simply. It is to present a conception of God which shall be at once Christian and credible. This is indeed no new thing; it is what Christian theology has always been attempting. The originality of Dr. Clarke's treatment consists in the way in which he solves his problem in detail.

In the first place, then, the idea of God which he presents is Christian. By this he means that it is consistent with the spirit and teaching of Jesus, the founder of Christianity. It is not an idea of God which we gain through modern science primarily and then baptize with the name Christian for the purpose of convenience. It is an idea which in its essential features grows out of the historic revelation recorded in the Bible and which, as such, can be scientifically defined and tested. A considerable part of Dr. Clarke's introduction is devoted to the study of the historic sources of the Christian doctrine, as they are found in Jesus' life and teaching. This does not mean that our author undertakes to reproduce Jesus' teaching concerning God in detail. Such an attempt, even if successful, would not accomplish the purpose which he has in mind, which is to present an idea of God which shall be intelligible to modern men. The language in which Jesus expressed his faith in God is very different from that of Dr. Clarke's theology. It is the language of popular religion, not of scientific thought. It has for its background the world-view of the older Judaism, a view in which the earth was regarded as the centre of the universe; where the existence of spirits, good and evil, was everywhere assumed; where human history was compressed within a few thousand years, and the final catastrophe with which it was to close was believed to be imminent. This view of the world necessarily affected Jesus' method of stating his doctrine; but it must not be identified with it. Jesus does not give us a metaphysical theory of God which stands or falls with a particular philosophy of the universe. He describes him in moral and religious terms, capable of application to very different intellectual surroundings and needing to be constantly reinterpreted, in view of the changes in contemporary science and

philosophy. Such an interpretation Dr. Clarke undertakes to give. "By the Christian doctrine of God," he tells us, "is meant, in the present discussion, the conception of God which Christian faith and thought propose for the present time, in view of the Bible and of history, and of all sound knowledge and experience, interpreted in the light of Jesus Christ, the revealer. It is a doctrine concerning which we can say at the point at which we now stand, that it is true if Jesus Christ does reveal God truly" (p. 4).

The position here assigned to Jesus illustrates a prevailing tendency in contemporary religious thought. In a sense far higher and truer than was the case with the older theology modern theology makes the person of Jesus normative for its thought of God. The old theology constructed its doctrine of Christ's person in the light of a preconceived conception of God. Jesus was two persons in one nature, a God who for the time had assumed the form of man, but whose real nature was unaffected thereby. Modern theology thinks of Jesus as a man, but a man through whom God's spirit has found such complete expression that it is possible to see in his character the perfect revelation of the heart of God. To believe in God, as modern theology conceives of him, means to extend throughout the range of universal experience that same gracious purpose and consistent character which Jesus has revealed within the conditions of a human life.

Two consequences follow from this principle. The first is, that theology must take its departure from the character of God rather than from those metaphysical attributes which express his relation to the universe, and which are therefore necessarily affected by changes in contemporary thought. The second is, that it must seek to conceive this character in a way that is consistent with the moral and religious teaching of Jesus.

Both these conclusions Dr. Clarke draws. Unlike the older theologians he begins his exposition of the idea of God by a description of his character, and then goes on to develop God's relation to men and to the universe. In his picture of the divine character he gives the central place to the qualities which Jesus himself made central in his own thought of God. Like Jesus he emphasizes the out-going love of God, the Father who is ever ready



to receive the prodigal, and whose gracious purpose anticipates the need of his children. Like Jesus, he emphasizes the extent of God's mercy, a mercy which reaches the outcasts whom the law has rejected, and finds more joy in the repentance of one sinner than in ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance. Like Jesus, finally, he emphasizes the consistency of God's character, the God who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the unjust and the just.

I say, he emphasizes the consistency of God's character. It is at this point that his departure from the older theology appears most clearly. The terms which Dr. Clarke uses are those familiar to historic Christian theology, holiness, wisdom, and love, but the meaning which our author puts into them is in many respects new, and the relations which they sustain one to another have undergone significant change. To the older theology holiness and love represented independent elements in the divine nature, each requiring its own appropriate gratification. The former expressed the opposition of the righteous God to sinful man, an opposition which required the punishment of all unrepented sin; the latter expressed his gracious purpose to redeem his elect through the forgiveness of their sins. Here we have to do with two apparently inconsistent, if not contradictory, impulses, and the chief problem of the theologian was to discover the way in which this inconsistency could be overcome, and the love of God gratified, consistently with his holiness. This, as we all know, was accomplished through the atonement of Christ.

Dr. Clarke is conscious of no such problem. To him holiness denotes simply the moral excellence of God, and love is the method in which this moral excellence comes to its completest expression. There is no inconsistency between them, for there is no independent end which the holiness of God sets for itself, as distinct from his love. God is not holy when he punishes and loving when he forgives, as in the older Calvinism. God is holy in his love, and loving in his holiness. He is not gracious to some men and just to others, but always and everywhere both just and gracious. His attitude toward every man is that of the father in Jesus' parable of the prodigal. As man's father, truly akin to him in spirit, it

is his supreme desire to conform his child to himself, and this desire is the explanation of all that he does. Whether he punish or forgive, it is but a step in his supreme purpose of redemption.

This conception of God's character gives unity to Dr. Clarke's theology. It frees it from the inconsistency and exceptions which meet us so frequently in the theology of the past. The dualism which was so characteristic a feature of the older Calvinism, and which expressed itself in the contrast between reason and revelation, nature and the supernatural, law and grace, has disappeared for Dr. Clarke. To him revelation is not the disclosure of an aspect of God's character, otherwise unknowable, but only the clearer manifestation of that which God has always been and of which, from the first, men have had more or less clear anticipations. As a spiritual being, man is fitted by nature to receive the divine revelation. Revelation is not the impartation by supernatural process of mysteries transcending the reason of man; it is the manifestation of spirit to spirit, and the recipient recognizes in the disclosure which comes to him from God not simply the revelation of the divine nature, but also the complete satisfaction of ideals of which he has long been conscious within himself. As the book which gives us the revelation of Jesus, the ideal man, God's complete self-manifestation in humanity, the Bible is indeed a unique book. But it is not God's first or only revelation, even on the side of God's love. From the beginning God has written his gracious purpose in the heart of man, and the disclosure which he has made of himself in Christ is recognized by those to whom it comes as the fulfilment of their own inner prophecy.

Redemption, in like manner, is not to be conceived as an exception to God's ordinary working, but rather as the normal method of his activity. It is not confined to a group, larger or smaller, whom God has arbitrarily chosen from the rest, that he may make them the subjects of his redemptive activity, but concerns all mankind alike, though in different order and degree. All history is part of a single process, in which God is training men for membership in his kingdom. In other words, all history is the history of redemption. Dr. Clarke does not indeed explicitly state that all individuals will be saved, but that is

the natural implication of his discussion. If any one is lost, it will be because of his own free choice. But the libertarian limitation which alone can avoid the conclusion of universalism is unacceptable to the author. Hard as it may be for us to understand, man's freedom must somehow be consistent with the divine determination. By moral means, to be sure, yet in the end, God must control, and we may be certain that he will have his way with every child of man.

This desire for ethical consistency appears instructively in Dr. Clarke's treatment of the trinity. To the older Protestantism, as is well known, the trinity had to do with inner distinctions in the nature of God himself, distinctions rendered necessary in order to overcome the fundamental ethical dualism to which we have already referred. According to Calvin, God is able to harmonize the conflict of the claims of justice and mercy in his own character, because as the second person of the trinity, the representative of mercy, he is able to bear the penalty inflicted by himself as the first person, the representative of justice. These ontological distinctions have lost their meaning for our author. The trinity is a truth of the Christian experience. The distinctions with which it deals concern man rather than God. They express different aspects in which God manifests himself to us as we contemplate the different phases of his redemptive activity. He manifests himself in the order of nature, the natural processes which are the necessary presuppositions of the religious experience. He manifests himself in historical revelation and supremely in the person of Jesus Christ, our Lord. He manifests himself, finally, in that personal experience through which we apprehend Jesus as the revelation of the God of all the world. Here we have three types of religion which correspond in a measure to the three historic doctrines: natural religion, "or the religion of God as he is known in the order of the world; historical religion, or religion which finds its support in the historical manifestations of God in events of time; personal religion, spiritual, experimental, mystical, that knows God in the soul" (p. 247). In all three aspects, it is the same gracious God who is revealed. The tragic contrast between the demand of justice and the appeal of mercy, which gives



dramatic interest to the older doctrine, has completely disappeared.

Such, then, is Dr. Clarke's God, a God ethically consistent in all that he does, committed with all the intensity of his moral nature to the redemptive purpose which Jesus has revealed, and strong enough and wise enough to insure the realization of this purpose in spite of every obstacle.

I say strong enough to insure the realization of his purpose in spite of every obstacle. With this we touch a second aspect of Dr. Clarke's view, which needs emphasis, namely, the fact that he attributes to this idea of God universal validity. According to our author Jesus' God is the God of the universe. When we raise philosophy's ancient question as to the ultimate explanation of the varied phenomena of the world, we find the only satisfying answer in the Christian idea of God. The so-called metaphysical attributes of God—infinity, eternity, omnipresence, and the like—are only so many different ways of asserting this simple truth.

Dr. Clarke's proof of this thesis occupies the last two sections of his book. The first, which treats of God and the universe, is expository in nature. It explains in detail what is the relation between God and the world which Christian faith assumes. The second gives the reason for believing that this faith is justified in fact.

It is not possible for us to follow the argument in detail. In substance, it reduces to this, that the qualities which we find essential in the Christian idea of God are so inwrought into the structure of the universe that it is natural to assume that it has the Christian God for its author. The universe is not something alien to man with which he connects himself, as if it were an existence of a different kind. "The human race is part and parcel of the universe, for it has grown up out of the life which was before it on the earth. . . . We have to do not with a late born race planted from the outside in a little world, but an ancient race which is of one substance with the universe, while its true life is in the powers of the spirit which reach out to that which is above" (p. 371). "It is plain that if this conception of the relation between man and the world be true, no partial idea of

God can satisfy humanity. We cannot think of him except as universal in his relations. He must be one God equally related to all souls and to all existences" (*ibid.*). Clearly, then, if the Christian idea of God be true, we should expect to find evidence for it not only in the spiritual nature of man, but in the universe, which is at once its home and its school.

Such evidence Dr. Clarke believes that we find. It is of two kinds, rational and spiritual. The former consists in the response which the universe makes to our efforts at rational explanation. The second, in the satisfaction which it yields to the demands of our moral and religious nature.

These arguments have a familiar sound. They seem to be only the well-known teleological and moral arguments in a new dress. But closer examination shows that this is only in part true. The older theologians used the evidence from design and the argument from conscience to establish the existence of a rational and a moral God, but they were persuaded that these arguments alone were inadequate to establish faith in a God of love; hence they supplemented the rational arguments by supernatural revelation. The dualism already referred to in connection with the idea of God reappears in the proof of his existence. Dr. Clarke, as we have seen, is unwilling to accept this limitation. Since the God in whom he believes is everywhere loving as well as holy, we should expect to find evidence of his love wherever his activity extends, and this Dr. Clarke believes to be the case. The argument from reason does not lead us to the door of Christianity and then stop; it is valid all along the line. The demand which we find within ourselves for a rational explanation of things finds its satisfaction only in the kind of God that Jesus Christ reveals. When we have come to think of God as Jesus did, and turn back to the universe, we find that all its elements fall into place as parts of the consistent plan, and mysteries which would otherwise baffle our reason find in him their solution.

The uniformity of nature, with its results in undeserved suffering becomes the means which the Father uses for the training of his children in courage and faith. The spiritual aspirations of man which seem so often in irreconcilable conflict with reality

are to the Christian evidences of a divine sonship which finds in God, and in God alone, its complete satisfaction. So the Christian idea of God proves everywhere a unifying conception. It harmonizes all the unrelated elements in our thinking and in our feeling. It gives us, for the first time, a consistent universe, and there is no other idea which does this with the same success.

Here, too, the position taken by Dr. Clarke is typical. In rejecting the dualism of the older apology, and relying for his proof of the Christian God upon evidence similar in kind to that of which we make use in other fields of experience, he is in touch with the prevailing spirit in contemporary theology.

But at this point our author is confronted with the fact of evil, that baffling and mysterious experience which has made shipwreck of so many philosophies. The test of every theology is its treatment of this problem, and Dr. Clarke's method is characteristic of the man. There are three possible attitudes which one may take to the problem of evil, no one of which satisfies our author. One may minimize its importance, question the account which it gives of itself, explain away its apparent harshness and cruelty, cloak its seeming vice in the garb of an unsuspected virtue, and thus by a process of ingenious reinterpretation bow it politely out of the world. Or one may recognize evil for what it seems to be, something real and terrible, and account for its existence through the hypothesis of a rival power, limiting and—to a greater or less degree—thwarting the purpose of a good God. Or, finally, still taking it at its face-value, one may yet subject it to God's power and find place for it within his purpose. This was the method taken by the older Calvinism. Calvinism, as is well known, saw in sin the means through which God's justice found an expression possible in no other way, and because the manifestation of justice was inherently excellent, whatever was necessary to make this manifestation possible could be ethically justified. This is the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards's famous sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God."

No one of these solutions satisfies our author. Evil in each one of its three great forms, pain, sin, and death, is to him some-



thing real and terrible, something to be shunned and fought and ultimately overcome, but it is not independent of God, nor an intruder in the universe which he has made. Evil is a part of the structure of the world. It is inwrought into the nature of things. It will have its place in the life to come, as well as the life here, for it is here with a purpose, and, as the older Calvinism rightly affirms, it ministers to the glory of God. But the purpose, as Dr. Clarke conceives it, is very different from that discovered by Jonathan Edwards. It is a purpose of redemption. Evil is here because without it man cannot be trained in the highest moral excellence. A world in which evil had intruded against the will of God would be intolerable to Christian faith, but a world in which God uses evil for his wise and beneficent purpose is a world in which the Christian can feel at home. Our difficulty consists in the fact that the training is so incomplete. There is so much evil which seems to yield no outcome in character. If every cross were a Calvary, the burden would be lightened, for we should see then what we only suspect now, the end which it is designed to serve. "If we could confidently include the vast movement of sin between a Godworthy origin and a Godworthy outcome we might still sadly wonder on the way, but we could rest in hope" (p. 461).

It is at this point that Dr. Clarke's position is most certain to be attacked. Most readers will be ready to admit that the idea of God which our author presents is Christian in the sense in which he makes the claim. The difficulty arises when we attempt to reconcile the idea of such a God with the facts of life as we find them. Those who demand logical demonstration before they are ready to believe will naturally find the evidence for Dr. Clarke's thesis unconvincing. Calvin's doctrine of God was easy by comparison. He saw all things in the world tending to a double issue, and he affirmed what he saw to be final truth. But to believe that our entire universe, filled as it is with countless miseries, with ruthless cruelties, with diabolical perversities, is really under the control of a being in character like Jesus; that this supreme power will some day guide it to an end which is good; that some day all mankind shall be organized into one great brotherhood; that service shall be the universal

law, and ministry the test of greatness,—this is indeed to make an heroic venture of faith. “Dr. Clarke,” caustically remarks a recent reviewer, “has succeeded in drawing a picture of God to which we feel no moral repugnance. But there is one most important attribute which he has omitted from the sketch, and that is the attribute of non-existence. Experience of the world does not lend the slightest plausibility to the theistic hypothesis as to its origin.”

Such an objection altogether misconceives the kind of evidence upon which religion relies for its proof. Religion is the child of faith, and faith is never confined to the present. It reaches out for that which is not yet, and affirms that it shall yet be true. Heroism is its native atmosphere, adventure its vital breath. To believe in God means everywhere and always to identify one's own highest ideal with ultimate reality. It means to rise above sense to the spirit, which is only in part revealed through it, and to be persuaded that this partial revelation shall some day be complete. Every man who has really believed in God has made such a venture. He has assumed the reality of the ideal and lived in anticipation of a future only in part revealed. He has dared to believe that the world that now presents only the raw material of goodness and truth shall become a fit habitation for reasonable and moral beings. He has done it because he could not help it, because without such an assumption life would not have seemed worth living, and because, when it was made, facts otherwise inexplicable fitted into place and the world became unified and consistent.

Is it reasonable to do this? From the individual point of view it is certainly most reasonable. Those who, like our author, hold the Christian idea of God because it satisfies the deepest needs of their own souls have no option but to assert its ultimate validity. Such a faith brings harmony into life where it would otherwise be discordant by promising ultimate victory to those ideals which seem supremely worthful. It assures those who are giving their lives to ministry to human need in all its various forms that their labors will not be wasted or their energies mispent. If the Calvinistic idea of God satisfied those who held it, it was because the age in which they lived was an age of bat-

tle, when men were on trial for their lives and for that which they held dearer than life, the truth of God. If this idea no longer satisfies us, it is because other virtues hold a more prominent place in our horizon. Our ideal is one of peace, not of war. We are less concerned to conserve than to impart, and the God who cares for the downcast and oppressed of every race and tribe is the only God who can satisfy an age which has witnessed the birth of modern philanthropy and of modern missions.

Are we, then, shut up to purely subjective evidence? Can nothing be said for this idea of God but that it satisfies the individual need? Is there no objective standard by which it can be judged, no social argument in favor of its validity?

The missionary activity of the Christian church is the best answer to this question. It is the expression of the conviction held by every sincere Christian that the response which the Christian idea of God calls forth in his own soul is not a purely individual matter, but is the answer to common social needs which can find their satisfaction in no other way. To the extent to which this faith shall prove justified in fact, the weight of the argument for the Christian God will be transferred from the experience of the individual to that of the race.

For those who look at the subject from this point of view there is much in the outlook that is encouraging. In spite of all that is dark and selfish in human life, it is yet a fact that the altruistic virtues are being more and more developed, and the ideals of war yielding place to those of peace. The Christian message of brotherhood and service is, as a matter of fact, finding response in the hearts of men. The very dissatisfaction that we feel at our shortcomings, the seriousness of the criticism to which our social order is being subjected, is the best evidence of the fact that the old selfish and particularistic ideals of an earlier age no longer satisfy us. The subjective response which the Christian idea of God calls forth in individuals is itself the result and evidence of a far-reaching social change which constitutes no small argument for its objective validity. It is, of course, always possible that this faith may prove mistaken. It is possible that Calvinism is right in its conception of a divided universe, and that we may be obliged to renounce as an idle dream our faith in the



good God whose love embraces every child of man. But, if this be true, it will introduce an irreconcilable discord into our inner life. If our ideals are to be justified in the real world, it can only be through the Christian idea of God. It is reasonable, therefore, in default of convincing evidence to the contrary, to act as if it were true.

And when we decide so to act, we find that reality answers our expectation. It is not simply that we ourselves find satisfaction in our faith, although that is true, but that the action which results from that faith changes the social environment for the better. Every man who believes in the Christ-like God and who acts out his conviction is increasing the amount of altruism in the world and making faith in such a God easier to those who have not yet believed. In other words, he is increasing the sum total of evidence in favor of the truth of the Christian view.

*THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF EARLY  
CHRISTIANITY*<sup>1</sup>

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Opinions as to the nature and origin of Christianity have been profoundly modified during rather recent years by the increased attention that has been given to the circumstances of the society within which its work was to be done. It is fortunate that these inquiries have been undertaken by scholars whose primary interest has not been to defend Christianity, but only to understand the conditions that necessarily determined its forms both of organization and of faith. Into their studies Christianity entered only as one element among many others, and it is this fact that gives to their results their peculiar value for the history of Christianity itself.

Approaching their problem from different points, the several writers here in review have had certain common lines along which they have sought to trace the movement of serious thought and the gradual growth of effective organization within Christian limits. These lines of study may be grouped for our purpose under four heads. First, the attempt has been made to understand the precise value of the existing Roman religious system

<sup>1</sup>Ludwig Friedländer. *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire*. Translated from the 7th edition. 3 vols. 1908-1909.

Gaston Boissier. *Cicero and his Friends; a Study of Roman Society in the Time of Caesar*. 1897. *La fin du paganisme*, 2 vols. 2d edition. 1898.

Franz Cumont. *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*. 2 vols. 1896-1899. *The Mysteries of Mithra*. Translated from the 2d edition. 1903. *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*. 1906.

Samuel Dill. *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*. 1905. *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*. 2d edition. 1906.

T. R. Glover. *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*. 2d edition. 1909.

W. Warde Fowler. *Roman Society in the Age of Cicero*. 1909.

Paul Wendland. *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und Christenthum*. 1907.

in so far as it followed the conventional forms. Then the singular phenomenon of the imported religions has been studied with the view of determining the cause of their extraordinary popularity and fixing, so far as possible, their relation to the official faith. Next, the multitudinous prevailing philosophies of the day have been examined to determine their contribution to the growth of new religious conceptions and their share in satisfying the demand of thinking people for a satisfactory solution of the most pressing problems of the spiritual life. Finally, the moral aspects of this over-civilized society have been considered, both in their relation to the prevailing philosophies and by themselves as indications of what kind of remedies were being suggested for the obvious ills under which this society was gradually sinking into a universal impotence.

The mere enumeration of these several points of view is enough to remind us rather forcibly that this society, upon which and within which Christianity was to work, was as far as possible from a dead society. Activity, in countless forms, is the first suggestion that meets us as we approach it. Even the conventional ancient religion had its phases and its periods of compelling activity. The foreign emotional religions can be compared only to the most active of modern Christian missionary undertakings in their fresh and vigorous appeal to those sides of the religious life which the religion of the state seemed least to cultivate. Philosophy appeared under such numerous and such widely popular forms that from time to time there was nothing to do but actually to forbid its profession by law as dangerous to the peace of mind of the community. And again if we single out the purely moral teaching of the best minds from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius, separating it as far as we can from the purely speculative content of the philosophical literature and making every allowance for the professional critics of social evils, we shall be equally impressed with the extraordinary energy of the moral appeal. We may not agree with its standards, but we cannot deny its sincerity or its value.

With these several aspects of the general subject in mind we are prepared to examine in somewhat greater detail some of the conditions which Christianity had to face in its attempt to re-



place all the religious forms prevailing in the Empire of the first three centuries by its own simple yet all-sufficient scheme of approach to the universal mystery. First of all, we are constantly reminded that this Greco-Roman society we are considering was profoundly divided by the distinction between religions of authority and religions of the spirit. On the one hand there still existed within the vast scope of the imperial rule a number of religious systems which, with whatever deviations from their original forms, still relied for their support upon the appeal to immemorial tradition. Such a religion, for example, was Judaism. No doubt the ancient worship had been profoundly modified by contact with other faiths and by the development of a wider outlook within the body of the Hebrew people themselves; but still the strength of Hebrew loyalty was called forth, as it ever had been, by the summons to preserve the faith of the fathers unspoiled by foreign admixture or by philosophic doubt. So it was also with the ancient historic faith of Persia. There the early absorption in the eternal problem of evil had fixed upon the race a form of religion in which the continuous antagonism of the principle of light with the principle of darkness gave the key-note to every phase of religious experience. So it was again with the still more ancient but far less easily definable religion of Egypt. There, under the government of Greek princes, the formal tradition of three, four, and we know not how many more millenniums, went on, exciting the attention, but baffling the understanding of philosophic inquirers, defending itself by constant reference to what it believed to be its original sanctions, and resisting as best it might the insidious attacks of speculative re-formations. And then, coming into contact, but hardly into rivalry with these other religions of authority, we have the official religion of all-conquering Rome, interfused at every point with the closely related but loftier and more spiritual cult of Greece.

This is the remoter background to every picture of the religious life of the late Republic and the early Empire, this group of ancient race religions, each one sufficient for the formal religious needs of its own people, each still acutely conscious of its great historic past, each resisting as best it could the encroachments of specula-

tive thought within and the manifold influences of foreign contact without. What strikes us most impressively in this aspect of our subject is the mutual exclusiveness and with it the mutual toleration of these diverse systems. No one of them makes conscious efforts to dominate the rest. That is indeed a part of the very character of a race religion. It is differentiated from others of its kind precisely as the race itself is differentiated from other races. What makes a race is this assumed fact of a different blood that cannot be shared by the members of another race, and, even though the purity of its stock may be violated in many ways, the theory of its inviolability is maintained in every race-manifestation. Its religion is a part of this inherited quality as a race. In strict theory it may not be shared by men of an alien race except through some device whereby they enter as by adoption into the race-compact. This exclusiveness may appear as hostility, but not of necessity. The gods are hostile only as the races are brought into hostile relations. Otherwise they are honorable strangers having the same right to exist as the races themselves. The missionary idea, that because we find our gods useful and agreeable to us, we ought to persuade or compel our neighbors to accept them for themselves,—this whole conception is obviously entirely foreign to the idea of strictly race-religions. In other words, the strict racial religions are by their nature tolerant of each other. There is no excuse in the nature of things for an attempt to impose one of them upon the others.

They are tolerant to each other, but not in the least through any conscious devotion to the ideal of religious toleration. Their toleration goes no further than a blind recognition of similar sanctions. Our especial interest in this phase of the question is with the attitude of Rome as the universal conqueror and sovereign. That attitude is defined in what we have just been saying. Rome was concerned primarily in securing the submission of the civilized world to her military power, her system of taxation, and her law. If these demands were satisfied, she had no further concern with the private lives of the conquered. She had her religion and they had theirs. They were as much entitled to their ways of dealing with the gods as she was

to hers. Even after the conquest, therefore, there was no significant change in the mutual relation of the traditional religions in the Empire. We shall, of course, be reminded of one apparent exception to this general statement. The worship of the emperor, foreshadowed already in the time of Augustus and made universal by later decree, seems to be an encroachment on the idea of universal toleration. A more careful consideration, however, will, I think, show us that the exception is only apparent. We shall approach this point by another and very instructive way.

Not only were the several religions of the world at once exclusive and tolerant; they were also to a great degree mutually translatable, one into terms of the other. When a Greek or a Roman, for example, came to inquire into the religion of another race, he was struck, as a foreigner trying to understand the life of a people always is, with resemblances, generally superficial, but to his mind indicative of common origin or common character. In the figure of the Hebrew Samson, he thought he recognized the familiar Hercules. In the Egyptian or the Persian sun-god, he found again his own Apollo. In the Magna Dea of Pessinus or in the Egyptian Isis he had no difficulty in recognizing the type of a universal goddess of fertility and prosperity. It seemed to him on the whole that after all these strangers were approaching the gods much as he was, and that the essential thing was that the gods should be acknowledged, not that this acknowledgment must have any one best mode of expression. The maintenance of the traditional worships was thus to the Roman one of the chief securities for that order and permanence in the community which was to him the all-important condition of a firm hold upon the vast complex of peoples brought together under the *pax romana*. Rome was willing to apply to the conquered peoples the same principle it applied to its own proper subjects: that the regular and orderly worship of the ancestral gods was all that could properly be demanded of a well-disposed community. Whatever was beyond this, passing over into the nebulous region of individual religious experience or learned refinement upon the simple forms of the past, was outside its interest or its control.

This prepares us to understand the Roman attitude in regard to the curious phenomenon of emperor-worship. The Empire was a complex of different peoples, each with its own traditions of race and religion: but it was more than that. It stood for a great idea, the idea of the unity of all races under a government that claimed to be, not an oppression, but rather an immense privilege and blessing. It insured to these hitherto warring and mutually repellent nations the gift of peace under law. It made plain the ways of civilization throughout the Mediterranean world. It welcomed to its capital city every form of human activity. Rome became the great world's clearing-house, into which entered every fruitful idea, only to be made practical and go out from there into wider regions of utility. If, now, the religion of a state was a necessary part of the national life, it must follow that this new national ideal should have its own peculiar religious expression. It was not enough that the ancient faith should be maintained for the benefit of the Roman by blood or by adoption. There must be added to it a something new to correspond to this latest manifestation of the universal Roman spirit. The introduction of the Genius of the emperor into the family of the gods supplied this need. The process was a familiar one. It was the same that had been continuously employed in the creation of new divinities, as new demands in the life of the individual or of the family or of the community as a whole had been formulated. That was one of the charms of polytheism, that it lent itself in such easy and picturesque ways to the varying needs of humanity. The elevation of the emperor into a deity was only a more impressive illustration of a widely prevailing tendency. It was not that the emperor became a rival of the other gods, or became in his own private person other than a fallible human being. It was only in the diseased imagination of an occasional individual mad with the drunkenness of power that such a notion could find place. In the normal understanding of thoughtful men the thing deified was the idea of the Roman unity and Roman power, exercised as divine unity and divine power were exercised, for the blessing of mankind.

And if this adoption of a new divine figure into the already well-peopled pantheon of Greece and Rome was a tolerably



easy process, its extension to the religions of the subject peoples was in one respect easier still. Certainly to the oriental races the identification of a supreme earthly ruler with the sovereign of the universe was one of the most familiar religious ideas. There was nothing essentially contradictory in their acceptance of the Genius of the Empire among their gods. It expressed to them in dramatic form the imposing fact of their incorporation into the Roman family.

But now these ancient and intensely localized religions had all been undergoing a subtle transformation. While their official forms and their traditional sanctions were being preserved apparently with little change, there had been growing up within the sphere of their nominal control other groupings of ideas that had led to various but curiously related manifestations. Let us take for instance the Egyptian as the most remarkable illustration of an apparently unchanged and unchangeable religious tradition. Alexander the Hellene died in the year 323 before Christ. The sovereignty of Egypt passed into the hands of the Greek Ptolemies. Alexandria, to all intents and purposes a new city, Hellenic rather than Egyptian, became henceforth the melting-pot of the ancient world. Into it was poured every ingredient that was to go to the making of that singular complex of ideas in the midst of which Christianity was to make the struggle for its life. Into it went the ancient religion of Egypt and out of it came profound modifications of that religion, stripped almost entirely of all that had made it peculiarly Egyptian, adapted to the new demand for a something universal that should take the place of the local, the traditional, and the racial. The worship of the ancient gods, Isis and Serapis, became separated from the traditional mythology in which they had borne a part, broke through all barriers of place and nationality, and went forth to conquer over the whole Mediterranean world.

A similar phenomenon is to be noticed in the case of Persia. There, too, the Alexandrian conquest had left its mark, not merely nor primarily in the destruction of the ancient Persian empire, but in the widened influence of Greek life and thought throughout the regions of western Asia. The essential feature of the Persian religion was, of course, its emphasis on the eternal conflict of

the principles of Good and Evil, embodied in the supreme personalities of Ahuramazda and Ahriman. This dualistic solution of the problem of the universe has never been permanently satisfying. As soon as the mind begins to work upon it, it is tempted on inevitably to seek a way out of the hopeless antagonism it implies. Somehow, at some time, there must be a reconciliation of the manifold oppositions of the dualistic world. If such a resolution of the problem cannot be reached from above downward through the teachings of philosophy, it will be tried from below through the instinctive feeling of the suffering masses of mankind. Some such origin as this seems probable for the very remarkable outgrowth of the Persian religion which attached itself to the subordinate figure of Mithra. The Mithraistic worship appears to have developed gradually, chiefly in the region of Asia Minor and to have had a useful function there in spiritualizing the thought of widely scattered communities long before it began its westward movement and thus came into rivalry with Christianity. Like the Alexandrian worship, Mithraism represents dissatisfaction with the conventional religion out of which it grew. It is an appeal to the individual, resting not upon the traditional basis of a religion of authority, but upon the response it may find in the heart of the religious man. In other words, it is a religion of the spirit. Like the Isis worship, too, it passes the bounds of race and country, and becomes a conquering force throughout regions that had so far never felt the touch of any similar appeal.

A similar line of reflection may be followed in regard to the conditions of the Jewish religion in the same period. Judaism had been carried bodily into every corner of the wide empire of Rome. Jews had gone as merchants and men of science out from the narrow conditions of their little province into the larger horizons of the Hellenic culture. More spiritual in its original form than any other of the religions of the ancient world, it lent itself more readily to purely speculative treatment. It was inevitable that Greek philosophy should react upon it with exceptional effect. The outcome was twofold: first a new religion, Christianity, as another type of a secondary oriental cult entering at once into competition and co-operation with the rest in the

spiritualizing of religious thought and second, a new philosophy, which was to prove one of the most effective agencies in bringing men to a realization of the Christian message. In that same great melting-pot of Alexandria especially through the work of the hellenized Jew, Philo, there was evolved a system of thought which in place of the multitudinous deities of the ancient world put one single mediatory idea, the idea of the Logos, the utterance of God, the expression of divinity that was itself divine. It was an evolution eminently in harmony with the best traditions of Hebrew thought. It helped to retain the primary idea of the indivisibility of the divine being, while at the same time it mediated between the abstractness and remoteness of this absolute deity and the limitations of the human mind. Some mediation the mind demanded. The great polytheisms had met this demand with their multitude of sympathetic creations moving in that half-world of the emotions, of fear and dread, love and hope, wherein the religious instinct has its natural atmosphere. The dualistic solution had reduced the range of these images of the divine, but had still left room for manifold encroachments upon the principle of unity. Here, in the combination of Hebrew unity with Hellenic powers of imagination, the idea of mediating agency was reduced to its lowest terms. The Logos, at once a divine reality and a result of human speculation, offered a way out of the ancient entanglements. Without any machinery of gods or demigods, this one sufficient Revealer of the divine plan was to enter vitally into every attempt to make Christianity acceptable to a polytheistically minded world. Philo was a contemporary of Jesus and of Paul, but there is no indication that his work was in any way affected by theirs or theirs by his. The two lines of effort are only so many illustrations of that universal tendency towards a spiritualizing and rationalizing of religious conceptions which we are trying to make plain.

The dominant religion of Rome thus found itself confronted, not merely by a group of traditional race-religions, but also by a new family of offshoots from those ancient faiths. The ancient worships were still going on. Their priesthoods were still committed to maintaining them, as far as might be, in the old ways.

From time to time revivals of enthusiasm for them showed that they were still powers to conjure with. But, from the point of view of the Christianity of the future, they were of far less importance than these new phases into which they seemed to be resolving themselves. The attitude of the Roman authorities toward these two phases of the great subject religions was distinctly different. Toward the original, traditional forms it took the position already described as the normal one among equal members of the great family of religions. It respected them because it understood them. Their sanctions were ultimately the same as its own. Their gods were only other representations of the same powers familiar to their own experience. It translated their names easily into those of its own pantheon. If these religions had remained as they were, there would have been no cause for alarm or for hostility. Indeed, since a stable religion was one of the first conditions for a sound national life, it was obviously for the advantage of Rome that her subject peoples should keep the gods of their fathers in undiminished reverence. When, however, we come to the newer and more spiritual religions, we find the situation quite different. Here were new groupings of men into units no longer definable in terms of race. The worshipper of Mithra was no longer necessarily a Persian; the follower of Isis was almost certainly not an Egyptian. The votary of the Magna Mater might belong to a patrician family of Rome or of any provincial city.

What, now, in the light of all we have been saying, must have been their reception as soon as their nature came to be understood? Would the traditional tolerance of the Roman rule be extended to them, and on what grounds? In speaking of this principle of tolerance, we omitted reference to an idea that was to be of decisive importance here and probably also in the final determination of Rome's attitude toward Christianity. We emphasized the notion of mutual ethnic tolerance on the basis of a common principle of religious life. The ethnic religions respected each other, we have said, because there was no basis in an ethnic religion for the idea of superiority of one religion over another in any such sense as to warrant or even to suggest persecution. When, however, one nation became the conqueror



of another and was obliged to find ways and means of ruling over it, then a new suggestion must obviously occur. After all, the gods of the conqueror, his *numina*, had triumphed over the gods of the conquered. There was no question here of true gods or false gods. The subject deities were none the less real powers because for the moment they had not been able to resist a superior force. They were no more to be exterminated than were the people who worshipped them. In any dealings with the people the gods were to be reckoned with. It would never do to lose whatever favor these respectable but unfortunate *numina* might be able and willing to show. They must be placated as well as disciplined, a combination of ideas familiar to every student of religious history. This consideration had doubtless weighed heavily in determining the policy of Rome toward the established religions. It could not apply, certainly not in equal measure, to these recent and less authenticated cults. In their case there was not only lack of prestige, but, by the same token, there was less cause to fear the anger or propitiate the favor of their offended deities. And here comes in the full force of that distinction between religion and superstition which meant so much to the Greco-Roman mind.

The appeal of these new religions was to nothing traditional or institutional, but directly to the individual and, worst of all, to the emotional. They were not philosophies that might have been regulated in their schools. They were not merely associations, that could be controlled under the law of colleges. They were invasions into the field that had hitherto been occupied by the accepted cults of Rome and her subject peoples. What should Rome do with them?

To this question there is no one answer that applies to them all or to the same one at all times. In some cases the action of the government seems to have been determined by some immediate impulse, as, for example, a sense of public danger, making it advisable to conciliate every possible element of the population and to secure the favor of every divine power. That would seem to be the motive for action in the case of the *Magna Mater*, the popular deity of western Asia Minor. It was in the midst of the stress of the Carthaginian war, in the year 204 B.C., that

the Roman Senate decreed the introduction of her worship into the city. Favorable results were almost immediately reported, but it is curious to note how jealous the official religion still remained towards this most attractive of invaders. It was to be generations yet before any Roman citizen was permitted to become a priest of the Great Mother. Not until the height of that great ferment out of which Christianity emerged do we find her votaries belonging to the leading families and her worship becoming distinctly one of the most fashionable varieties of religious excitement. A similar history meets us in the case of the worship of the Egyptian, or rather Alexandrian goddess Isis. Perhaps at about the same time, the beginning of the second century before Christ, her votaries had wandered into Italy with merchants or with public embassies from the capital of the Ptolemies. From that time until the middle of the first century B.C. there is a series of outbreaks of persecuting zeal altogether  
\* similar to those of a century or two later against Christians. Again and again the worship of Isis was prohibited, her temples destroyed, and her priests driven out. But after every such demonstration there was a prompt renewal of the fascination which her appealing personality excited, and soon the circle of her votaries was again complete. The government, following in this as in other matters the lead of popular movements, now became as eager to recognize what promised to be of value for its control as it had been to persecute what seemed hostile to its most precious traditions. Emperors and senators vied with religious fanatics and hysterical women in paying divine honors to a deity who seemed to encourage them in all the most captivating indulgences of an over-refined civilization.

Quite otherwise, however, is the story of the reception of the Mithra worship in official quarters. So far as our records go, there is no evidence of official persecution. To whatever cause this may be owing, whether to its identification with other familiar forms of worship, whether to the universality of the central conception of the sun-god as the source and centre of all life, which seemed to withdraw it from any possible hostility to the accepted deities of Rome, or whether, possibly, to its deep moral appeal and comparative freedom from fanatical elements,

the fact remains that it was able to make a slow but triumphant progress over great parts of the western world without exciting the kind of enmity that followed Christianity from the start. An ingenious attempt has been made by the scholar above all others fitted to make such an attempt to show that this exemption from persecution by the emperors was owing to two elements in the Mithraic cult derived from its Persian origin. One of these was the identification of the notion of the Roman Fortune represented in the person of the emperor with a curious idea in the Persian religious system of a similar personification of the Destiny of Kings as a something apart from, yet inseparably connected with their earthly career. The other is the notion that the Sun, the spirit of light victorious over darkness, was identified with the idea of the emperor as the victorious embodiment of supreme rule on earth. These are attractive theories, but they serve rather to illustrate the fact of a certain sympathy between imperial Rome and absolutist Persia than to explain the immunity of Mithraism from the fate which overtook the other oriental claimants for western recognition.

We have not so far made use of a word which one is sure to meet in every treatment of this subject, the word "syncretism." It is a very convenient term, partly because it may be made to mean much or little as occasion demands. Perhaps we have already caught a glimpse of its useful meaning in our reference to the readiness with which the several established and polytheistic religions could translate, each into its own terms, the ideas and personalities of all the rest. It was quite natural, for example, that the Roman historian Tacitus, trying to give an intelligible account of the religion of the Germans, should say that they worshipped Mars, and that Hercules had made a journey through their country. This same ready interchange of religious formulas passed on then to those other new religions which we studied as offshoots of the older faiths. As new candidates for popular favor, it was but natural that they should be criticised and more or less explained away as only new-fangled ways of telling the old things.

But then followed another stage of the process, to which the word "syncretism" gives us a clew. Not only was each of the

new religions to be thought of as a novel way of putting the case for the older one from which it had sprung, but, taking them all together, new and old, a philosophic and unprejudiced mind could look at them all at once and see in them after all numerous likenesses. Hence to such a mind it came to be possible to build up out of them all a kind of eclecticism that answered in place of undivided devotion to any one. That, so far as I can understand it, is what we mean by syncretic tendencies. One who sets out with this object in view, comes soon to the conclusion that in the midst of this apparently hopeless confusion of religions and superstitions and philosophies and mysteries there was, after all, a perfectly recognizable striving after one common end, and that end was the reduction of these multitudinous varieties of religious expression to some simple formulation that should replace them all and prove sufficient for the clearer vision of a new time. What we may safely call the universal demands of the religious instinct were coming out into clearer light, as the merely decorative, or merely institutional, or merely conservative elements were being recognized as unessential. The unity of God, the fact of sin, the necessity of a redemption, the demand for an individual future life and the insistent call for some mediatorial being or beings between the supreme deity and the world of men and things, these are the broad, simple outlines of a theology to which all the phenomena we have been considering were making their several contributions. Syncretism represents a state of mind that made it possible to approach the whole subject without prejudices and with a receptive attitude towards all truth as it should commend itself to individual reception. It is a state of mind that ought to be easily understood by us. Never, since that time, I suppose, has there been so great a readiness as there is now, to come to the subject of religion in a similar attitude. Once more, in the light of new scientific and philosophical methods, religion is undergoing a critical examination as to its acceptability to the individual conscience. It is not enough that men point us to authorities or assure us that these things have been good for the men of the past. We demand that they shall respond to the insistent needs of the present and of ourselves who are called upon



to live in the present and do its work. It is impossible to read the highest thoughts of those first Christian centuries without feeling the instant kinship with much of our present day experience. As in our own day, the anchors of the ancient faiths were lost, and men were groping about for new guarantees of safety.

Illustrations may be found, for example, in the great popularity of the worship of Aesculapius, the ancient parallel to the modern "religion of health," and also in the Mysteries that had grown up as expressions of the emotional life within the circle of Greco-Roman religious forms. It is conceivable that through the elevating and refining of these semi-official attempts to approach the ultimate source of divine truth a way might have been found that would have led into the simplicity and clearness that proved the chief recommendation of Christianity. Such, however, was not to be the solution.

Not through any native development, but through the group of foreign cults, all of them oriental in their origin and each of them representing a development out of an older formal race-religion, was this craving after a higher spirituality and a simpler form of expression to be satisfied. These are the group of secondary religions already briefly referred to. Two among them, the Mithra and the Isis worships, illustrate best the tendencies we are here following. Our knowledge of the Mithra worship in detail is a thing of very recent date. Numerous references to it in the time of its greatest expansion in the second and third centuries and later left no doubt of the profound impression it had made in the western world. Scattered remains of Mithra shrines were found long since in many parts of Europe. But it was reserved for a Belgian scholar, Franz Cumont, not more than a dozen years ago, to make such careful researches into these monuments that we are now in possession of material for a really comprehensive view of the subject. As a result it has now become a necessity for every rational attempt at a history of Christianity to take into account the extraordinary achievement of this its most dangerous rival. We are able to see now, as never before, first, that Christianity was called upon to contend, not only with the formal, official religion of Greece and Rome, but with a competitor quite on its own lines, and second, that in this competitor

it found not only a rival that at one time threatened to be successful, but also an ally. For in so far as Mithraism succeeded in replacing the official religion by a more spiritual and personal cult, just in that degree it was preparing the way for the still more spiritual and equally personal appeal of Christianity itself. It is this study of Mithraism, more than anything else, that has once for all freed us from that fancy-picture of the earlier historians, in which Christianity appears in a prolonged grapple with a hopelessly irreligious, depraved, and unspiritual world.

Mithraism is an obvious derivation from the ancient Persian faith. That faith, we have already had occasion to observe, was essentially a dualism, in which two supreme powers were always contending for mastery over the universe and the soul of man. It was a dualism, but it had added to this simple notion of a dual government of the universe an abundant decoration of polytheistic elements. It had found its satisfaction in personifying powers of nature, and then had ranged these as best it might under its dualistic scheme. Mithra represents one of these additions. He is the god of the light, the radiant being through whose benign influence life is carried on in all its varied forms. He is the sun-spirit, whose light and warmth stimulate fertility and bring prosperity to the people. Nothing can resist his victorious march, and as he conquers all obstacles, so the people he loves shall overcome their enemies. His most frequent title on the inscriptions is *sol invictus*, the unconquered Sun. Like his Grecian prototype, Apollo, he has his own mythology. The central myth represents him as a mighty hunter going out to the chase of a wild bull. To a nation of herdsmen the bull stood for the idea of power, the wild bull for the notion of power unrestrained and needing to be brought under control for the service of man. In the course of his chase Mithra overtakes the bull, mounts him, and rides him at furious speed. He is thrown from his seat, but clings to the bull's horns and holds on until the bull is tired out. He then throws him to the ground, takes him by the hind legs, tosses him over his back, and drags him to a cave. Here he is visited by a crow which brings him a divine command to slay the bull. The bull escapes and leads Mithra another chase, but is finally overtaken and thrown to his knees. Mithra half

seats himself upon his back, seizes him by the nostrils, draws his head backward and plunges his knife into his neck. The powers of evil instigated by Ahriman, send a dog, a serpent, and a scorpion to prevent the beneficent effects of the sacrifice. The dog and the serpent try to drink up the blood that flows from the wound, and the scorpion fastens upon the vital organs of the conquered bull. In spite of these efforts of the evil one, however, the blood flows down upon the earth and becomes the source of fertility to the fields of man. The vital strength of the bull engenders all the animals useful to man. Mithra is represented as performing this sacrifice unwillingly, in obedience to a higher command. The myth presents him thus as the agent of beneficent creation. All good things are made by him. He is the *demiourgos*, the worker for the people, a figure familiar within Christianity in the Gnostic systems, identified there with the creative Jehovah of the Jews and easily recognizable in the orthodox descriptions of the Christ as the creative agent in the process of world development.

I think we can understand the appeal of this figure to the allegiance of men groping after a tangible expression of the divine idea. In the general disruption of the Persian state following the Alexandrian conquest, groups of Mithra worshippers seem to have formed themselves in the eastern parts of Asia Minor and to have become established there long before the westward movement of the worship began. The agencies for the expansion toward the West were furnished by the Roman conquest. The precise process is unknown to us, but there seems every reason to believe that there were three of these agencies, the army, trade, and the circulation of slaves.

Through these natural channels the new religion found its way especially along the great Roman roads over into the Balkan countries, up the valley of the Danube to where its upper waters almost touch those of the Rhine, down the Rhine valley, spreading out over the Agri Decumates, the angle between Rhine and Danube where colonies of Roman veterans had long been settled, and so on down to the Low Countries, across the Channel and up into Great Britain as far as the wall that held Roman England against the Scot. By other roads it passed over most of Italy

and France and found a resting-place here and there in Spain. It has been possible to make a map of this distribution, indicating only those places in which actual remains of Mithraic buildings have been found, that is most impressive in its completeness. It gives a kind of proof not attainable in equal measure for any other of the imported religions, of how thoroughly the work of these Mithraic missionaries was done. There is, however, one striking exception to the completeness of this conquest. In the whole of Greece there has so far been found but one positively authentic Mithraic shrine, and that is at the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens, a place famous in antiquity, as it is today, for the conglomeration of nationalities that made up its population. It appears quite certain that this one temple was built by orientals, who brought their religion with them and formed a little community of their own. The same is true almost as completely of the western coasts of Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean Sea. How shall we explain this phenomenon? Is it owing to something repellent in the Mithraic worship to the native Greek mind? Perhaps; but there is another suggestion certainly plausible. If we compare this map of the Mithraic distribution with another showing the probable distribution of Christianity at about the same time, we are struck by the evident fact that it is precisely these regions of least influence of Mithra that show the most powerful effect of Christianity. The conclusion seems almost irresistible that where Christianity had already come to satisfy the demand for spiritual religion it offered an impassable barrier to the work of the Mithraic mission. This conclusion is further strengthened by the exemption of the whole north coast of Africa as far west as Carthage.

The remains thus certified to are singularly uniform in character, with sufficient diversity to show a certain freedom in the use of a common body of ideas. They establish beyond all question the nature of the Mithraic temple, the conventions of Mithraic art, and the cycle of legends that formed the chief possession of the worshippers. This monumental evidence leaves us in no doubt whatever as to the territorial expansion of the faith of Mithra. More important for our purpose, especially



in relation to the parallel development of Christianity, is the inquiry into the special attraction of this new cult for the society in which it worked. This inquiry opens out naturally into two: first, why did Mithraism appeal as strongly as it evidently did to the religious sentiment of the Roman or Romanized populations, and, second, why did it fail to hold its place in the face of the advance of Christianity? In the first place, Mithraism shared with the other new religions the advantage of concentrating the thought of the worshipper on one central divine figure. It answered to the demand we have already considered for some way out of the confusion of the world's polytheisms into the clearer light of some one sufficient expression of the divine idea. Again, its appeal was, so far as our monumental evidence goes to show, mainly to the religious sense of the common man. Then, the organization of the Mithraic community appealed to that sense of mysterious union in a mystical bond which is so evident in connection with the ancient mysteries of Greece. A ceremony of initiation, with personal tests of courage and devotion, gave an added value to the more purely doctrinal aspect of conversion. If the word "church" seems too elaborate for this association, we may perhaps picture it to ourselves more accurately under the word "lodge" or even "club." There is, I believe, no evidence that the Mithraic organization as a whole had any central organ or representation. Its priesthood may have implied a separate or professional character, but on this point we are not clearly informed. Membership in the association was divided into several, perhaps seven stages, each represented by some symbolic figure of man or beast, suggesting a possible analogy to the totem groups of many other religions. It appears quite clear that full membership was open to every grade of social standing, but it is of importance that women were excluded from all participation in the privileges of initiation.

As to specific doctrines, the one all-pervading thought of Mithraism is the idea of struggle between the powers of good and evil, light and darkness, derived from its ancient Persian origin. Mithra is the ever-present power aiding men in their constant effort to overcome the forces of evil. Life is a conflict, and it is only to the victorious in that human struggle that the highest

rewards of the future are reserved. In other words, Mithraism was a profoundly moral religion. Its ideals were those of purity, courage, hope. It had as a natural consequence its suggestions of ascetic restraint as a means of clarifying the spiritual vision. It had its doctrine of redemption. In the fulness of time Mithra is to reappear on the earth. A divine bull, the counterpart of the original victim, is to be ready for the sacrifice. The dead are to arise from their graves in their former shape, are to recognize each other, and then all are to be subjected to a final judgment by the God of all truth. Mithra is again to sacrifice the sacred victim and from his fat mingled with wine is to prepare a miraculous beverage, a draught of which insures to the righteous immortal life. The wicked are to be destroyed by fire from heaven, the Spirit of darkness shall perish with them, and the whole universe shall enter upon an eternity of bliss.

The resemblances to Christianity suggested by this outline of the Mithraic system are too obvious to need any considerable emphasis. Concentration of thought upon a single divine personality. Membership in a wide-spread association to which admission is procured by personal conversion and the due performance of prescribed rites of initiation. A theology in which the individual soul is presented in the closest relation to the divine being. A morality insistent upon the highest standards of personal self-control. A doctrine of the future life, simple and vague enough to leave room for wide individual interpretation. A doctrine of redemption dependent upon the righteousness of the life that now is. It seems almost as if there were nothing left for the religious consciousness to ask, or for any religious system to supply. And in fact, in the course of the third century, while Christianity was being subjected to the most cruel test in the general persecutions, Mithraism was enjoying a popularity that seemed likely to secure for it a permanent hold upon the religious need of the western world. It had made its way upward into the highest circles of Roman society. Emperors had lent it the countenance of their patronage, and the dread of it as a dangerous rival is reflected in the apologies of the most ardent defenders of the Christian faith.

Let us now notice in a similar way the other of the more impor-

tant imported faiths of the early period. Like Mithra, Isis was a subordinate figure in the mythology from which she was selected for especial honor. In the Egyptian religious system the dualistic idea of conflict between the powers of good and evil is present, but it is distinctly subordinated to the notion of the supremacy of a group of beneficent beings. In the several provinces into which the elongated territory of the Nile-civilization naturally fell, these beneficent powers were represented under various names, but they were usually grouped into triads, or trinities, in which the principle of sex has its not unimportant part. Of these triads the most nearly universal was that of Osiris, Isis, and their offspring Horus. It is idle to attempt too precise definitions of the characteristics of these several personalities. They cross each other, replace each other, assist each other according to the circumstances of the moment. The analogy with the speculations about the several persons of the Christian Trinity, their individual characters, their relations to each other and to the universe of men and things, is too obvious to need pointing out. The difference is that while these Christian problems were discussed in the schools of theologians, the Egyptian ideas were expressed in the plastic imagination of a people who thought in pictures and translated their thought into elaborate and picturesque mythologies. Taking for our guide the Greek Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> who wrote in the first Christian century, and who was as anxious as we can be to reach the larger truths that underlay the myth-making instinct of mankind, we can come to a reasonably clear and simple interpretation of the myth of Osiris and Isis. It seems quite clear that Osiris had come to stand in the Egyptian imagination for the primal conception of the sun as the lord of all being, the creative and energizing source of life and prosperity for the sons of men. Isis stood for the receptive and directly productive agency in being. If Osiris was the river Nile, with its fertilizing flood bringing life to the whole world of Egypt, Isis was the cultivated land bearing in its season the fruits and cattle on which the people were to live. If Osiris was the life-giving sun, Isis was again the earth that received his rays. But the sun dies

<sup>2</sup> "Of Isis and Osiris," in Plutarch's *Morals*. Translation edited by W. W. Goodwin, vol. iv, 1870.

every day, conquered by the inevitable night. We need not dwell upon the immense preoccupation of the Egyptian mind with the idea of death and a life beyond it. It was only natural that a deity who should come to have the supreme place in the regard of Egyptians should become also and especially the deity of the underworld. And that is what happened. Osiris dies, but in death he does not disappear. He only becomes so much the more an object of absorbing devotion. The death of Osiris is the subject of the elaborate myth which Plutarch tells, assuring his readers that he is giving only such parts of it as will serve to make plain its meaning.

The cause of the death is the malice of Seth, whom the Greeks call Typhon, the spirit of evil, desiring above all things to destroy the source of life for the universe. After Osiris had brought mankind up from a savage to a civilized state, Typhon laid a plot against him. He gave a grand banquet at which he exhibited a very beautiful casket, promising to give it to any one who should find it just fitted to his body. Osiris tried the experiment, but as soon as he was nicely inside, Typhon clapped on the cover and set the box afloat in the river. It had many and strange adventures, but the substance of it all is that the faithful Isis never gives up her efforts to find and protect this body of her spouse against the wiles of the evil one. At one point Typhon succeeds in recapturing it and cuts it up into fourteen parts which he throws about in all directions. Plutarch explains this as a mythical representation of the fact that Osiris was worshipped at a great many places, each of which claimed to be his proper burial place. Isis busies herself with hunting out and collecting these scattered members and putting them together again. Osiris, therefore, dies; but it is only as the sun dies, to be renewed in undiminished glory with the new day. He is resurrected from the dead, and it is this risen Osiris who commands the reverence of the people and gives them the assurance that because he lives they shall live also.

It is interesting to notice that Plutarch, born within a few years after the death of Jesus, writing this account to a lady who was a priestess of Isis, immediately adds:



If, therefore, they say and believe such things as these of the blessed and incorruptible nature (which is the best conception we can have of divinity) as really thus done and happening to it, I need not tell you that you ought to spit and make clean your mouth (as Aeschylus speaks<sup>1</sup> at the mentioning of them. For you are sufficiently averse of yourself to such as entertain such wicked and barbarous sentiments concerning the gods. And yet, that these relations are nothing akin to those foppish tales and vain fictions which poets and story-tellers are wont, like spiders, to spin out of their own bowels, without any substantial ground or foundation for them, and then weave and wire-draw them out at their own pleasure, but contain in them certain abstruse questions and rehearsals of events, you yourself are, I suppose, convinced (c. 20).

Plutarch, that is, himself a man of the transition age, is trying to get out of these stories, which he sees to be absurd, the inner truth which he is sure lies beneath them, and distinguishes them from mere fanciful fabrications of human imagination. His syncretism is here abundantly illustrated. He takes great pains to show that the names of the gods are mere accidents, purely local in their origin, while that which constitutes the nature of the god in question is universal.

And those are not some in one country and others in another, not some Grecians and others barbarians, nor some southern and others northern; but as the sun, moon, land, and sea are common to all men, but yet have different names in different nations, so that one discourse that orders these things, and that one forecast that administers them, and those subordinate powers that are set over every nation in particular, have assigned them by the laws of several countries several kinds of honors and appellations (c. 67).

It is out of this curious mingling of truth and fiction that the later worship of Isis emerges in the form it was to take in its triumphant progress westward. Unlike the Mithra worship, that of Isis seems to have moved first along the waterway of the Mediterranean and found its best reception in the great centres of western life. It was a cult that appealed especially to the jaded senses of the more refined classes of the population. Like Mithraism it concentrated attention upon one central figure, and this figure was one easily recognizable as corresponding to

an ideal already familiar to the religious traditions of the West. Our readiest way to understand the attraction of this new candidate for popular favor is to follow the most complete account left to us of the experience of one of her votaries.

Apuleius of Madaura in northern Africa, writing in the second Christian century<sup>3</sup> interpolates into his amusing and amazing farrago of magical tales an account of a conversion and initiation into the mysteries of Isis which has always been accepted as in the main an authentic reproduction of the mental and spiritual states involved in such a process. Apuleius was a type of the restless, inquiring spirit of his age. A wanderer over the earth, he interested himself especially in the numerous forms of religious excitement that were claiming attention from the dissatisfied multitudes. In one famous passage he describes the antics of certain travelling priests of the *dea Syria*, a troop of vagabonds who combined the functions of priest and magician to the scandal of the rural communities on whose credulity they played. The scene is a vivid presentation of the corruption of one of the most widely popular of the oriental imported cults.

The eleventh book of the *Metamorphoses* is entirely devoted to the description of the Isis ceremonial we are here considering. Up to this point Apuleius has been following the fortunes of a fictitious Lucius, who, early in the book, has been turned into an ass and under this unhappy disguise has been able to see and hear many things not always accessible to ordinary mortals. Finally, escaping from the last of his human tormentors, he lies down to sleep on the shore of the sea, and is there blessed with a vision of heavenly sweetness. The goddess Isis appears to him in splendor and promises him an early release from his penance and restoration to his human form. The eloquent description of her person corresponds quite precisely to the representations preserved in monuments. A part of her address to the amazed and delighted Lucius is specially interesting to us here. She begins:—

Behold me, Lucius; moved by thy prayers I appear to thee; I, who am the source of the universal order, the mistress of all the elements, the primordial offspring of time, the supreme among divinities, the

<sup>3</sup> The Works of Apuleius: translation in the Bohn Library, 1853.

queen of departed spirits, the first of the celestials, and the uniform manifestation of the gods and the goddesses; who govern by my nod the luminous heights of heaven, the salubrious breezes of the ocean, and the anguished silent realms of the shades below; whose one sole divinity the whole orb of the earth venerates under a manifold form, with different rites, and under a variety of appellations. Hence the Phrygians, that primeval race, call me Pessinuntica, the Mother of the gods; the Aborigines of Attica (call me) Cecropian Minerva; the Cyprians in their sea-girt isle, Paphian Venus; the arrow-bearing Cretans, Diana Dictynna; the three-tongued Sicilians, Stygian Proserpina; and the Eleusinians, the Ancient Goddess Ceres. Some call me Juno, others Bellona, others Hecate, and others Rhamnusia. But those who are illumined by the earliest rays of that divinity the Sun, when he rises, the Aethiopians, the Aarii, and the Egyptians, so skilled in ancient learning, worshipping me with peculiar ceremonies, call me by my true name Queen Isis (Apuleius, *Met.* xi, p. 226).

A more positive declaration of the syncretism we have been trying to understand could not be desired. This is Isis, the supreme Deity. She is best known to the Egyptians, but is none the less worshipped by the rest of mankind, only under different names. She can have no hostility to these stranger gods, for she is fully aware of their real identity with herself.

The goddess disappears, the day, the fifth of March, begins to dawn, and with the earliest rays of the sun appears the pageant which is to celebrate the opening of a new year. It is charmingly described by Apuleius, the narrative taking form around the restoration of Lucius as the central moment. The grateful suppliant now devotes himself wholly to the service of the goddess, passes through the required initiatory stages of self-denial, and is finally admitted to the divine presence. His prayer, as he approaches her image, is a rapturous invocation to the supreme embodiment of the divine idea.

Thou, O holy and perpetual preserver of the human race, always munificent in cherishing mortals, dost bestow the sweet affection of a mother on the misfortunes of the wretched. Nor is there any day or night, nor so much as the minutest particle of time, which passes unattended by thy bounties. Thou dost protect men both by land and sea, and, dispersing the storms of life, dost extend thy health-giving right hand, by which thou dost unravel the inex-

tricably entangled threads of the fates, and dost assuage the tempests of fortune, and restrain the malignant influences of the stars. The gods of heaven adore thee, those in the shades below do homage unto thee; thou dost roll the sphere of the universe, thou dost illuminate the sun, thou dost govern the universe, thou dost tread the realms of Tartarus. The stars move responsive to thy command, the gods rejoice in thy divinity, the seasons return by thy appointment, and the elements are thy servants. At thy nod the breezes blow, the clouds are nurtured, the seeds germinate, and the blossoms increase. The birds as they hover through the air, the wild beasts as they roam on the mountains, the serpents that hide in the earth, and the monsters that swim in the sea, are terrified at the majesty of thy presence (Apuleius, *Met.* xi, p. 241).

Here is monotheism suggested in every line. This deity does not exclude others; she absorbs them. They are all but broken lights of her, the supreme being. She unravels the threads of the fates. The mind that could reach this height is certainly feeling after God, if haply it may find him.

Such, in some of its most striking manifestations, is the world of thought and feeling into which Christianity was born, and within which, during at least eight generations of men, it was making its struggle for life. If we compare its course with that of the two popular religions we have just been considering, we find, in spite of many resemblances, certain fundamental differences which may help us to understand why the outcome of this rivalry was to be the victory of the cross and the final defeat of the bull-slayer and the queen of the heavens, protector of men upon the sea and of women in the house. Christianity shared with these other cults the concentration of thought upon one single redeeming personality. But the immense and decisive difference was that this personality was, in the Christian scheme, not merely a divine abstraction, requiring to be represented by symbols and sacrifices, but also an absolute and perfect historical human being. That was the one fundamental fact, which not all the speculation of all the theological schools could obscure. It was ridiculed by enemies, played with by friends, repudiated by authority, but there it was, and out of every encounter it emerged once and again in more and more convincing form, until, after one last death grapple with the whole combined force of the



Roman state it found its champion in a ruler clever enough to see that it was the winning cause.

Again I think we may fairly credit a large share of the triumph of Christianity to the elevating and purifying of religious thought that the other faiths as well as itself had gradually brought about. As one reads the Christian apology, one feels continually the effort to strip away all that was mechanical, material, of the earth earthy, idols, sacrifices, elaborate formulations, all that insistent half-world of magical dealings with the unseen, and to bring the religious consciousness of the world face to face with the great simplicities of the early teaching of the Master and his first disciples. Enough of the beggarly elements were left, in all conscience, enough to bring reproach upon official Christianity from that day to this, but the victory was won, when these great simple outlines of the faith had made themselves clear to the spiritually awakened multitudes. To believe in one God, who was a Father, in one revealer, who was at once man and God, and in a Holy Spirit about which might cluster all the highest things the mind could compass,—this was a faith at once so broad and so compact that it needed none of the mechanisms of the ancient systems to commend it to the devout and kindled imagination.

Other explanations are abundant and easy. It is true that in the onrush of the Germanic invaders from the North, precisely those regions along the frontier where the altars of Mithra had been most thickly planted, were those that had to bear the fiercest brunt of the attack, and there is little doubt that this furious border-warfare sealed the fate of Mithraism in those parts forever, but we may fairly ask why it was that these wild invaders were not won over to a form of religion that seems to offer so many more points of attraction than the more spiritual appeal of Christianity. In the case of the Isis worship, it is easy to see the excesses into which it quite naturally led, and to ascribe its failure to these; but none of the charges against it are worse than those brought against Christians by their enemies, and in both cases the defence must be the same,—that such extravagances were no true expression of the real spiritual service that both were able to render.

It is fair to ask what would have happened if Constantine

had seen fit to adopt the militant religion of Mithra instead of the lowly service of the cross as the support of his usurped power. Is it likely that he could have carried it to ultimate triumph as the prevailing religion of the Empire? I think there can be little doubt that such an attempt would have resulted in disastrous failure. It was not the support of government, welcome as that doubtless was, that gave to Christianity its convincing power over the lives of men. It was its answer to the riddle of the ages, its solution of the eternal problem of mediation between the human and the divine, through the idea of an essential union between them. No matter how that idea might be expressed, whether in the accepted creeds of the church or in the more individual interpretations of independent thinkers of all ages, the idea itself remains the permanent contribution of Christianity to religious thought and the secret of its triumphant progress.

## NEW FORCES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

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## I

In 1866 a certain clergyman in New York wrote a discourse to which he gave this characteristic title: "Christian Education the Remedy for the Growing Ungodliness of the Times." The production won in its day sufficient fame to be preserved as a pamphlet in the Harvard Library; but there it has long remained unsought, its presumptions of finality dependent at last, for even a bare reading, on some whim of historical curiosity. One need not so much as glance at the discourse to know why it lies, with many a like effort, quite forgotten. The title tells the story of its dogmatic temper, its easy ignorance of ends and means, its lack of insight into childhood. The point of view is naively, comfortably, loftily external: it recognizes no great problem in its subject, no need for new data, new thought, new purposes. Discourses of that sort are not written now—or, if written, not preserved.

With every year, to be sure, far more is printed on the same general topic than was ever printed in the sixties. Even the inattentive lay reader cannot escape contemporary discussion of religious education; but the modern discourses are of a new kind. The *Poole's Index* list of magazine articles under Religious Education shows this growth and change with striking concreteness. Beginning in 1802, the *Index* for eighty years includes only fifteen references to the subject, all of which are serenely general in character. "Religious Education for the Masses"; "The Religious Education of a Family"; "The Religious Education of Children," these titles fairly represent the kind of treatment which this topic inspired during the nineteenth century. The record in the *Index* for the four years beginning in 1902 offers a sharp contrast. There are thirty references under Religious Education, and of these a large majority bear titles which

show that they are scientific in temper. They are intensive studies in the history or the principles of religious education, or formulations of definite problems in its theory or practice. These titles are characteristic: "Religious Education before the Reformation"; "The History of Religious Education in the Public Schools of Massachusetts"; "The Need of a Professional Conscientiousness in Religious Education"; "The Philosophy of the New Movement for Religious Education"; "The Place of Action in Religious Education;" "Scientific Aspects of Religious Education"; "The Relation of Religious Education to Science."

Here is a strong current of popular expression; and beside it runs a slighter but increasing stream of more technical production. The source of both lies probably as far back as 1882, when G. Stanley Hall brought out in the *Princeton Review* his article on "The Moral and Religious Training of Youth." Since that time the scientific study of religious education has progressed slowly, but steadily. *The Pedagogical Seminary*,<sup>1</sup> a Clark University publication, has produced from time to time studies such as Barnes's "The Theological Life of a California Child," some of which have been very profitable. In 1904 President Hall founded *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, which is now in its ninth issue and which has already had occasion to welcome to its field a German magazine of like character. Although the *American Journal* has published more studies in religious psychology than in religious education and has been throughout somewhat too narrowly the organ of a school, it has performed the important service of bringing before educators, in a dignified way, the problems of religious development in the child. A certain number of books devoted wholly or chiefly to the scientific study of religious education have also appeared: in Hall's *Adolescence* (Appleton, 1907), Horne's *Philosophy of Education* (Macmillan, 1904) and *Psychological Principles of Education* (Macmillan, 1907), the theme is central; and it is the exclusive concern of Coe's *Education in Religion and Morals* (Revell, 1904), Crooker's *Religious Freedom in American Education* (American Unitarian Association, 1903), Haslett's *The*

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i, no. 2; vol. ii, no. 3; vol. iii, no. 3; vol. vi, nos. 2, 3; vol. vii, no. 2; vol. viii, no. 4; vol. xv, no. 2.



*Pedagogical Bible School* (Revell, 1903), Burton and Mathews' *Principles and Ideals for the Sunday School* (University of Chicago Press, 1903), Dawson's *The Child and his Religion* (University of Chicago Press, 1909), and of two collections of essays, *Principles of Religious Education* (Longmans, 1900) and *The Child and Religion* (Putnam, 1905). There are besides a few books of less importance on the general subject, and a number of Sunday-school guides and manuals which have a temporary practical interest; but the books here named present the deeper problems of religious education and point the direction of its future progress. Professor Coe's volume is by far the most profitable of them all.

The chief record of recent advance in the study of religious education, however, is yet to be mentioned, namely, the *Proceedings*<sup>2</sup> of the Religious Education Association. In these we have five volumes of constructive discussion covering every phase of religious nurture and teaching, the worth of which it would be difficult to appraise too highly. They present the views of leaders in the school, the church, the Sunday-school, the university, and in life, and they offer at once a body of invaluable data as to problems and tendencies and a collection of workable programmes for practical education in religion. Under the quickening influence of the Association, other bodies, such as the Unitarian Sunday-school Institute at the Isles of Shoals, report yearly more and more profitable discussions.

It is plain that men are thinking more earnestly about religious education than ever before, and in a new way.

This renaissance is not, however, a mere matter of study and discussion. There is increasing evidence of larger and more effective practice and of a new attitude and new purposes in the work. Half of the twenty-four million children of school age in the United States are enrolled in Sunday-schools, and if this in itself signifies little, the wide-spread effort to improve the work of the schools signifies much. That effort is not hard to illustrate.

<sup>2</sup> The Improvement of Religious Education; The Bible in Practical Life; The Aims of Religious Education; The Materials of Religious Education; Education and National Character. (The Religious Education Association, 72 East Madison St., Chicago.)

Within a brief period and in various quarters, the items which follow have successively borne witness to some new aim or some new method in the practice of the Sunday-school—and the number of such concrete details could be multiplied almost indefinitely: the Church of the Disciples in Boston pays all its Sunday-school teachers; President George A. Coe of the Religious Education Association has been called to a new chair of religious psychology and religious education in Union Seminary, New York; the Cuyahoga Sunday-school Association of Cleveland, Ohio, has issued an announcement of plans for the training of teachers; St. Paul's Universalist Church, Chicago, although small, has undertaken a good programme of graded activities and courses; the Senior Course of the Bible Study Union (Blakeslee) series of lessons deals with missions; the Committee on Religious Education appointed by the Presbyterian General Assembly favors, among other things, a comprehensive scheme of educational activity for the churches, to include "courses in missions and courses in civic problems and service"; vacation Bible schools were conducted five days a week last summer in Boston, Providence, Albany, and Pittsburg.

These are random gleanings from a single field, signifying a new mode of attack and greater accomplishment. From the work in other fields one gains a like impression. Much educational activity outside the Sunday-school has always been essentially religious in spirit and purpose, as, for example, the work of the Young Men's Christian Association and kindred institutions. In this work of late the broader outlook and the greater zeal have been plain to all. There is about it a new freedom and a new practicality based on a new approach to its goal in the religious life. The religious training given in colleges and private schools, whether denominational or not, has shown the same changes. From all sides comes the evidence that religious educators are dealing at last with the whole problem of human development, struggling at close range with the dynamic forces of human nature, in order to unify them in religious insight, faith, and devotion. This is the very essence of the new movement.

One great means of making religious education more effective is as yet, to be sure, hardly more than foreshadowed in practice.

When the new forces shall have done their full work, the simplest and most convincing mark of their presence will be this, that all secular training will be turned to account in the religious life. The public school is now avowedly secular, and the home has given up much of its responsibility for religious development in the child; but these facts will mean to the new religious education only an added opportunity. The religious teacher will see that specialization of functions has merely given to him the larger task. It is his to lay hold of all that is elsewhere accomplished for good and to organize it into an inclusive religious consciousness centred in a devoted will. For so important an educational duty a special institution will always be needed, but more than any other institution it must secure, and know how to use, universal coöperation.<sup>3</sup> The Sunday-school is actually attempting to make itself worthy of this central place; but the more difficult task remains of securing in every agency for secular education a sense of its duty to the ideal of religious development. School subjects can be so taught, school discipline can be so administered, that the dominant spiritual attitudes demanded by religion shall be reinforced, not weakened.<sup>4</sup> Every phase of the child's nurture and the youth's training can contribute something toward the development of a religious consciousness, and this without warping education from any of its normal channels.<sup>5</sup> Much may be done by clubs and associations not directly affiliated with either church or school,<sup>6</sup> and many distinctly secular agencies (for example, the library, the college fraternity, the social settlement, the playground) may help by special means to give physical, intellectual, and social training their due value as parts of the larger education of the spirit.<sup>7</sup> Here is a great practical problem of coördina-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. G. Stanley Hall, "Relation of the Church to Education," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. xv, no. 2, and William D. Parkinson, "School and Church," *School Review*, September, 1905.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. P. Hughes, "Types of Religious Attitude," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, vol. ii, no. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. L. H. Gulick, "Religious Aspect of Group Games," *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. vi, no. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. W. B. Forbush, *The Boy Problem*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the numbers of *Religious Education* for 1909-10.

tion, towards the solution of which only a little has here and there been done.

But that anything has been done at all—or even that the ideal has been so much as conceived—is an indication that religion and education stand now in a new and promising relation. Their aims have been so broadened that they harmonize and interpenetrate. This is the meaning of the new movement: religious education has been redefined in terms of human development. Educational institutions and activities whose aims once seemed indifferent or even repugnant to religion are now seen to be pursuing the very purposes of religion itself;<sup>8</sup> and institutions and activities once so religious as to ignore or slight education are now pursuing educational ends in the conviction that only thus can religious ends be attained. Thus missions, always wise in this respect, are more than ever placing their religious work on an educational basis and conceiving their religious task in educational terms.<sup>9</sup> And the church itself begins to recognize that the religious life it fosters must needs include every worthy aim of education. In short, the modern practice of religion everywhere implies and includes education, and in the modern practice of education it may no longer be said that any part shall not be in effect religious.

It is evident that men are working more earnestly for religious education than ever before, and with a new outlook.

These facts have a possible significance of the very highest importance. In themselves they are encouraging; but seen in their relation to the traditional modes of the religious life they become even prophetic. Too often one hears it said that the church is losing its power over the lives of men. Fewer candidates present themselves for theological training; congregations do not grow as they ought; there is an excessive expenditure of effort and an almost shameful ingenuity of appeal in securing financial support; new sects and faiths are evidence of religious unrest, etc., etc. But in the face of these doubts about the older

<sup>8</sup> See the address by Professor F. G. Peabody in *Religious Education* for April, 1909.

<sup>9</sup> See the survey by Professor E. C. Moore in *Religious Education* for October, 1909.



forms of religious activity, men are interested in religious education to an extent hitherto unknown and in ways that are altogether new. The church as a whole may need to readjust itself to changed conditions; in its educational department it does not need to readjust itself so much as it needs to recognize and use its own new power. And this fresh life is not induced by fears for the church; even if the church were proved to be in danger of instant dissolution, this movement could not be ridiculed as a frantic attempt to revive it. The leaders here are not all churchmen, and even the churchmen approach the work quite as often from the side of the school, the home, the state, or the child, as from the side of the church. Times have been ungodly before this without any such result. There have been great revivals through appeals to the adult conscience, such as the Methodist revival of the middle of the eighteenth century; there have been mighty schemes for religious education established in the interest of the church, such as the opposing systems of Luther and the Jesuits; but when has there been any such disinterested concern in the child himself as a religious being, and in his complete religious development? The dream of Comenius, of Francke, and of Froebel seems almost ready to be realized.

Who can limit the part this new interest shall play in the divine comedy? If the church is destined to come successfully through her present trial as a social institution, may she not owe to the new forces in religious education no small part of her victory? And if that far dearer triumph of the religious ideal is ever to be won, wherein the daily lives of men shall prove at last that a common faith in God can make us brothers, to what forces will that moving faith be due so largely as to these? Never before, at any rate, has religious education promised the results it promises today.

## II

To speculate about these larger effects of the new movement would by no means be a waste of time. But although ultimate ideals must always be our final standards in education and the remoter outcome of our effort becomes in consequence the source of our chief inspiration, the data for judging the worth and the

direction of our actual work lie nearer home. I turn rather, therefore, to the immediate causes of the new movement, its present alliances, its most salient characteristics, and its nearest aims.

Important reforms cannot be explained by reference to changes in the external conditions of life; their deepest causes lie in the hearts and minds of men: but no movement is quite an unrelated occurrence, and to understand the special features of a change in one field we must often take into account the changes in fields that seem perhaps remote. The half-century just preceding the rise of the new movement for religious education was marked by great changes in many fields, with a general tendency towards specialization of social functions and unification of social purposes. A few of these changes, it is clear, have affected very directly, and still affect, the progress of religious education.

The first of these is the change in the position and power of the home. Without any attempt to retrace the steps in this process, which elsewhere have been fully described,<sup>10</sup> it is sufficient here to recall the fact that the American home has given up one after another of its specific responsibilities. The home undertakes fewer tasks than ever before. By this I do not mean that there are more homes of wealth and leisure, or that the amount of work to be done in support of a home is less; I mean that no home has the variety of concerns it once had. Specialists do the work that used to be done by the parents in the home, and parents in turn are specialists outside. Economic details are too obvious to need recounting: what home today is independent of the department store? Nor need I do more than mention the weakening of home responsibility in many of the more personal concerns of life, such as health and education. Our whole social organization, indeed, has become less genetic, more individual: churches no longer count their membership, as a matter of course, by families; the state no longer, as in early colonial days, leaves education to the family; we are beginning to take away from the family the responsibility for the very condition of its children's eyes and ears and teeth.

<sup>10</sup> See chapter i of *The School and Society*, by John Dewey, University of Chicago Press, 1900.

The resulting problems, all important, range from manual training in the school to the economic and political status of women. Of course religious education has not escaped unaffected. Religious nurture is not carried on in the modern home to that extent and with that skill which Horace Bushnell, half a century in advance of his time, saw to be desirable. The temper, the conditions, and the limitations of the modern home are all against it. Accordingly, the new religious education is based at the outset on the admission that the specialist must undertake religious education, as he has undertaken secular education, and must bring to it a professional consciousness equally trained.<sup>11</sup>

This requirement is even now not totally unfulfilled, as some of the facts cited above may show, and causes other than the one just described combine to strengthen it; but another requirement, seemingly dissimilar, has arisen in intimate connection with this one. With many voices proclaiming that home responsibility has been generalized unduly, or even disastrously, has come the attempt to restore to the home some of its old specific obligations.<sup>12</sup> The Third International Congress for Home Education, for example, meets this year at Brussels under the auspices of the Belgian government. The discussion and activity due to this reaction have not, however, been directed against specialization as such. No one has tried to make us forget that division of labor means a better product. No one has denied that we are better in health since we have given up dosing at home and rely wholly on doctor's orders; that we are better educated since the state has taken full responsibility for our schooling; nor that similar effects should follow from expert leadership in religious education. Everyone admits that the work of religious education is complex and difficult; that it demands organization, skill,

<sup>11</sup> The Proceedings of the Religious Education Association continually emphasize this need. In May, 1908, the Council of the Association issued a call to colleges and universities to provide in their departments of education special training in religious pedagogy.

<sup>12</sup> Coe, *Education in Religion and Morals*, p. 282 ff.; Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, vol. i, pp. 108, 117, 122 ff.; vol. ii, pp. 21, 46, 51 ff.; vol. iii, pp. 67, 333 ff. Also, on the general question of home responsibility, Joseph Lee, "The Integrity of the Home a Vital Issue," *The Survey*, December 4, 1909.

material, and above all a direct and powerful social imperative which the home, lacking numbers, cannot supply. The real object of the reaction and its best result has been the recognition that an important part of the expert's work must be the stimulation and conservation of home influence as a specific contribution to religious development. The centre of effort has shifted to the Sunday-school and allied institutions; the home has less to do and is no longer the leading power: but the final burden of support still rests upon the home, and there can be scant success if the home does not coöperate.

Modern religious education, then, must do outside the home much that was once done in it, and must, besides, secure the intelligent coöperation of the home itself. These requirements are indeed correlative, and they point to a principle of unity in religious education which is highly important. It is fatally simple to educate children by parts. Because a skilful Sunday-school teacher can keep a class comparatively quiet through a prayer and some responses, and can get them to learn some Bible stories and a text, the school may rest content with a superficial success which hinders in the end that wholeness of life which vital religion prescribes and produces. Religious education must aim to affect life deeply throughout its whole extent; it cannot be a matter of the mind alone, nor of the heart, nor of good deeds; it cannot confine itself to a single institution nor to a narrow range of habits. Its only success is in the enthusiastic, intelligent, active dedication of all human powers to the divine purpose expressed in ideals. The necessary conditions of an achievement so profound are the central position of the agency that attempts it and its ability to coördinate to its uses every influence that bears on the child's development. If in this matter the new movement has almost everything yet to do, at least it sees clearly the direction in which it must work.<sup>13</sup>

It is natural to consider next a process which may be called a direct influence on the development of the present status of religious education, viz., the evolution of the public school. For this discussion, the great outstanding fact about the public school

<sup>13</sup> See almost any number of *Religious Education*, but especially the issue for April, 1909.



is that it is thoroughly secular. Practically speaking, the problem of explicit religious instruction in the state-supported schools of America is settled. It is still discussed, and ably,<sup>14</sup> but the discussion affects practice hardly at all. Whatever the public school may yet do for instruction or training in morality, officially, at least, it can do nothing towards the teaching of religious belief and very little towards engendering religious emotion or religious habit. That it can do its own work in ways which strengthen the hands of the teacher of religion I have already intimated; and that the teacher of religion must in turn endeavor to utilize secular instruction and training I have urged as essential: the fact to be noted here is that the secularization of state schools has rendered only the more inevitable the result brought about by the weakening of home responsibility,—specialization and expert leadership in religious education.

A second change in general education during the last fifty years has affected religious education more deeply, if less obviously, than the secularization of the schools. The early nineteenth century saw a radical reconstruction in educational theory, which has since had the most momentous results in educational practice. The "New Education," to be sure, has been lightly ridiculed, idly condemned, and ignorantly attacked; and it has also been sincerely misunderstood by those who are loyal to older ideals and would judge by these the product of the new. And the reform has suffered much, besides, from injudicious friends. But no one who has traced its rise through sincere thinking and eager self-sacrifice can treat it lightly; no one who has followed in its development the interplay of the great insights and enthusiasms of the century can condemn it idly; no one who knows the story of its gradual but certain triumph can be satisfied to judge it from without or by measure. Its inspiration is of that same source whence modern democracy and modern science draw their power: it can no more fail than they. Problems of many sorts it has left, to be sure, unsolved; but it has set us in the right way to solve them, and one central principle, at least, it has established beyond attack.

<sup>14</sup> Pro: The California Prize Essays on Moral Education, Ginn, 1908. Contra: Crooker, Religious Freedom in American Education. The German system is frequently reported and discussed in educational magazines.

That principle is best called, I think, the principle of development. The somewhat barbarous term "self-activity" was applied to the central form of it by Froebel, chief expounder of its pedagogical applications, but the word development shows more clearly its manifold relations. For this doctrine in pedagogy is but one aspect of a many-sided conception, as the reform in which it has been applied is but the educational phase of a far more comprehensive change. It represents in education a mode of thought that has come into possession of the whole field of human interests. The scientific doctrine of evolution represents, of course, its most conspicuous triumph, and through the theory of recapitulation has had direct bearing on educational thought. But the habit of thinking in terms of development did not originate in science, and has not been confined to science. Montesquieu, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, foreshadowed in the eighteenth century and in non-scientific subjects our present evolutionary point of view; and long before the scientific theory had been established, a developmental mode of thought had been introduced into philosophy and theology through the doctrine of the immanence of God. In our day psychology, including the psychology of religion, has profited most by the conception of development. The historical method of study in every field, with the whole apparatus of research, is also one of its outcomes. Nor is it difficult to trace the influence of this mode of thought in the victory of democracy: Rousseau's cry, "Back to Nature," little as it indicated a correct conception of a natural state, did indicate a great new faith in the forces which guide the life of man, and in this faith the whole principle of development is implied.

For the principle of development everywhere forbids an external point of view. It demands of us with respect to human life that humility which the scientist displays towards nature. Not that it asks us to accept human life as it is;—our own ideals, themselves the strongest of all factors in the development of man, are of the highest significance for our guidance: but it asks us to study human nature as it is, begin with it as it is, trust its essential forces, and guide them to worthy expression rather than attempt to repress them or substitute others. It

insists that progress cannot result from conformity to outward standards, but must come finally through new sensibility to values, through new purposes, through insight and ideals.

The point of view of the new education, therefore, is always from within. It studies children to determine their normal powers, their normal interests, their normal processes of growth; in formulating its programs of study it endeavors to do no injustice to the natural life of childhood. And it teaches children by inductive, active, and inspiring methods; it does not try to make instruction interesting in order to make it easy or agreeable, but it tries so to gauge the work to the child that the possibility of real achievement and the successful exercise of creative power shall engender self-sustaining interests and permanent purposes.

Towards this point of view the schools have been progressing for over half a century, until at last it begins to dominate their work. And this point of view religious education has now adopted. When one remembers the Calvinistic opinion expressed by Jonathan Edwards that "young children are vipers and worse than vipers" in the sight of God, it is not surprising that religious education should have been tardy in adopting the idea of development; nor is it surprising that religious education should now be even more insistent upon it than secular education is, seeing that the fundamental principle of the divine immanence has at length won general acceptance in modern theology. Be that as it may, the new religious education finds the primary sanction for its work in its belief that there are in children natural impulses which may be guided into religious expression, natural needs which may be satisfied in the religious life, natural tendencies which may be developed into religious purposes. It accepts the necessity of graded instruction, inductive methods, and continuous expression of religious motives, feelings, and ideas in forms appropriate to each successive stage of growth. Modern religious education believes that the religious life can be fostered only by progressive development from within.

One corollary, perhaps I should say one aspect, of this principle has sometimes escaped even its most ardent advocates. Froebel

made it as important in his educational philosophy as "self-activity" itself, but the adequate recognition of it in the schools is a matter of the last few years, whereas "self-activity" has been recognized for at least a generation. I mean the social aspect of development. When one conceives growth as a process of accretion, the individual may readily be conceived as a collection of powers or faculties and society as a collection of individuals; but when one grasps the idea of development, it is no longer possible to avoid a more organic view both of the individual and of society. The result is at once a more social view of the individual. The development of the individual is seen to depend upon his entering into the great relationships of life. Education becomes, therefore, preparation for effective and significant living as a member of society; it has in view at every stage the social use of knowledge and power; it teaches languages, literatures, arts, and sciences not as bodies of dead fact to be acquired for personal adornment, nor merely as products of individual genius to be mastered for private enjoyment, but as social products, media of social communication, to be mastered and acquired by methods which will strengthen social-mindedness, to be known and enjoyed in ways that will not prejudice social living, to be used for social ends. There are many indications that this point of view is becoming steadily more effective. It is prominent in modern educational writings<sup>15</sup> and such movements as that for industrial education are signs that the modern school is fast becoming an institution for the social direction of individual development.<sup>16</sup>

Of course the public school is not the only field in which the social aspect of development has been applied, nor is educational theory the only subject in which it has been recognized. The comparative study of religion, of art, of literature, of law, all mark a recognition of the fact that no man liveth unto himself alone, that no nation liveth unto itself alone. And that no man shall live unto himself alone, even as much as he can, is the avowed

<sup>15</sup> Witness such recent titles as Henry Suzallo, *The School as a Social Institution*; Colin A. Scott, *Social Education*; Paul Natorp, *Sozialpädagogik*.

<sup>16</sup> For a survey of progress from this point of view see the "Report of Educational Progress," *Proceedings of the Harvard Teachers' Association for 1909*, *School Review*, May, 1909.



purpose of a host of modern organized activities, charitable, civic, cultural, political, religious. Religion shows the social spirit of the time perhaps as strongly as any interest of man, for whereas it once appealed to each man to save himself, it now appeals to him to save others; whereas it was once satisfied with negative, individual holiness, it now demands an active social purpose—devotion to the kingdom of God on earth.<sup>17</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that the new religious education recognized the social aspect of development as soon as it recognized the principle of development at all. Once our theology had regained the idea of an immanent God, it was not long before our religion began to regain the social purpose of Christ; and when theology and religion were found to be in accord with pedagogy and with life, religious education was bound to set for itself a social aim and adopt a social method.

As the new secular education proposes to prepare the individual for fuller and more serviceable membership in the family, in civil society, and in the state, so the new religious education proposes to prepare him for fuller and more serviceable membership in the mightiest community of all, the brotherhood of a divine humanity. Religious education is preparation for conscious and effective membership in the church invisible to which all inevitably belong, whose service is service of the common life through loyalty to ideal causes. As the larger relationship includes the smaller, so must religious education include secular education; in other words, it must strengthen the social influences of secular education and give them final sanction and direction. Further, it must make the ultimate relationship effective by means of all the others, and in turn effective in them; in other words, it must use loyalty to the family, to society, to the state, as stepping-stones to loyalty to God, and must see to it that loyalty to God means increased devotion to every lesser human duty. Modern religious education takes as its aim the complete and effective development of a social consciousness in the individual.

<sup>17</sup> A. C. McGiffert, *How may Christianity be Defended Today?* Hibbert Journal, October, 1908.

## III

The main features of the new religious education, viewed in the light of the influences that have affected it, are, then, these: it is to be an education under special and expert leadership, but it is to be widely inclusive in the scope of its interests and activities; it is to base its whole effort on the natural characteristics of children and is to guide their growth by self-expressive and creative methods, but it is to take its direction from a thoroughly social aim. In outlining the influences which have contributed to these results I have made central certain marked changes in the home and in the school, which from a pedagogical point of view seem, indeed, to have been especially important; yet it has been impossible to avoid references to science and government, to literature and art, to philosophy and theology, for the changes in these fields have also had important effects on the new movement. Of continued influences from the field of theology the rest of this discussion must take still further account, since the bearing of theology on religious education is closely connected with the topic I propose now briefly to consider, viz., the relation between the Sunday-school and the church.

It is not too much to say in general that the Sunday-school has oftenest been considered as a mere adjunct to the church, its function that of a recruiting station. If other views of its place and office have now and then found expression, none have been widely accepted. It will readily be supposed that the new movement stands on the contrary for a far broader view of the Sunday-school. The Sunday-school, it declares, is to prepare children for a religious life, and in a religious life church observance is only one element.<sup>18</sup> The church and the Sunday-school must be conceived as integral parts of a single educational institution,<sup>19</sup> the power of which will be conditioned, to be sure, by the number of persons it can reach, but the success of which

<sup>18</sup> G. A. Coe, *Religion as a Factor in Individual and Social Development*, reviewed in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, vol. i, no. 3; also in *Proceedings of Religious Education Association*, vol. i, p. 45.

<sup>19</sup> See E. M. Fairchild, "The Function of the Church," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. ii, no. 2.

must be judged eventually by its effect upon their lives. The church exists for the Sunday-school, as well as the Sunday-school for the church; and both exist for the religious life, which extends far beyond either.

In the practice of the Sunday-school the consequences of this view of its place and function are varied and important. The curriculum must be graded; extra-biblical material must be freely used; there must be more hand-work, more active and dramatic expression, and more concrete embodiment of religious ideas and emotions in deeds; hymns, prayers, and responses must be adapted to the pupils, sometimes chosen by them or even composed by them; in short, every detail of the work must be such as will aid in the development of a religious life that is real, powerful, inclusive of every spring of action and every worthy relationship, progressive, and self-sustaining.

It is obviously impossible to discuss all these points here. I turn instead to a problem, not named above, which involves the relation of theology to religious development, and which at the same time brings up in a new light the whole question of the bond between the church and the Sunday-school. It is the problem of teaching a creed.

If creeds have been almost universally disparaged in our day, they have not suffered a lonely martyrdom. Every product of the pure intellect has been humbled. "This voluntaristic age" has taught ideas their place: they are instrumental. Evolutionary psychology, social psychology, pragmatism, and the American temperament have combined to give final worth to the concrete, to deeds. Religious psychology has lisped in its infancy what the elder psychologies have more maturely spoken, and our faith in the human efficacy of creeds, especially as agents in religious development, has been severely shaken.

Now much that religious psychology has accomplished must be conceded to be permanent. The conception of religious development worked out by one school of religious psychologists<sup>20</sup> is to most minds so much more comprehensive, searching, stimulating, and practicable than anything else we have

<sup>20</sup> I mean such writers as Coe, Starbuck, and Oosterheedt. They do not form a school in any literal sense.

had, that it is likely to stand at the very least as our best working hypothesis. This conception makes religious education no training of a special sense or faculty, nor an initiation of youth into an esoteric experience, nor the expression of feeling and desire through isolated and unusual channels, nor the attainment of a strained and unnatural view of the world. It looks upon religion as a life lived with reference to an inclusive relationship. As filial piety is the product of the family relationship and may be expressed in any one of the ways in which men express themselves at all; as patriotism is a product of the state-relationship and may engage the whole range of a man's powers,—so religious thought, religious emotion, and religious purpose are expressions of religion as the relationship of man to God. If this relationship has characteristic modes of expression, it is none the less inclusive of all others and regulative of them. The religious psychologists who decide from the returns to a *questionnaire* that religion is the special interest of a limited class are performing a somewhat misleading service. It has been known for some time that a good many people are not religious, as it has been known that a good many are not patriotic, or dutiful, or cleanly. The question that interests us is, Can they be made so? Of course, if sense experience does really exhaust the truth, and God is not the universal father who commands us through our own ideals, then we shall be wise to look upon religion as an interesting psychological phenomenon occurring functionally in a limited number of people, and we shall not waste time in the endeavor to develop every child's "religious nature." But if we are willing to risk our lives on the belief that "things are not what they seem," we shall insist that religious insight, religious sentiment, and religious loyalty are eternally valuable to every individual; that the religious attitude is essential to individual and social development; that the religious life is normal. This is the conclusion of the only religious psychologists who have done much practically helpful work.

It is evident that this conclusion makes the value of a creed in religious development depend upon the general value of intellectual conviction in life. The dictum that religion depends



but little upon creeds is thus only one way of saying that life depends but little on thought; and it seems probable that this view has been more or less over-emphasized of late. No doubt men have set too great store by intellectual systems—particularly false ones; no doubt they have too easily regarded them as established; no doubt, above all, they have been mistakenly zealous to force them ready-made on the mind of youth: but all this does not lessen the value of thinking as a means of interpreting life and so of guiding it. If ideas are only instrumental, at least they are that. As very highly valuable instruments we must continue to use them, in religious education as everywhere else. Thinking is a fundamental mode of living, and theologizing a fundamental mode of thought. If its products must be tested by life, they are not the less precious; and the church that really believes in its creed will not consider its educational aim accomplished until it has convinced its pupils of its important truths.

Yet the attitude of the modern church towards its creed is, of course, and must be, very different from the older attitude. Today the church emphasizes essentials and broad practical consequences, not special doctrines and fine theoretical differences; it urges the faith as a support and an incentive, not as a duty; it bids men take it with them into the world and live by it, but it does not condemn them if they cannot believe. And in expounding the creed it takes to heart the ancient psychological insight—he that doeth the will shall know of the doctrine. It tries to keep the formulated belief fresh and meaningful and vital by uniting it with such depths of experience as originally gave rise to it, and by applying it concretely to the guidance of life.

This view of the modern church with respect to the uses of formulated belief in adult life has made easier of acceptance the new view with respect to the teaching of creeds to children. Catechisms can no longer be dogmatically taught and mechanically memorized with the expectation that the ideas they contain will discharge the high office of interpreting experience and guiding conduct. Doctrines, the church admits, must help in the organization of life; a creed must be central, organic, re-

freshing itself forever as it illuminates and is illumined by the moving forces of the heart and mind. That no creed can be thus held whose truth is not whole and clear and compelling is here beside the mark; the important thing to be noted is that the modern view of the creed makes it absolutely essential that it be properly taught.

Here, then, is the crux of the matter: How shall the creed be taught so that it shall be vitally held? Has the new movement a well defined message here? Apparently it has, but not an exhaustive one. No one can lay down the whole law on the teaching of religious truth, because the problem has not yet been solved. A few principles, however, the new movement has made clear, and of these one at least brings out in a striking way the relation which the new movement proposes between the Sunday-school and the church.

In the first place the new movement believes that dogmas as such should not be taught to young children at all. The beliefs which an adult can grasp intellectually must be presented to children by means of symbols, which touch the imagination. And even so, the greatest care must be exercised in choosing the symbols, so that literalism shall not spoil their imaginative appeal nor fable be taught as fact.<sup>21</sup> In the second place the new movement has made it clear that children must be led to act in the spirit of a belief long before that belief is presented to their understandings. And their action must be as varied and as significant to them as it can be made, so that it shall really establish the predisposition which the creed is later to crystallize in formulas. Finally, the new movement insists that when doctrines are eventually taken up as such, they be presented not as fixed and unshakable truths, but as vital problems with which every youth must struggle in his own mind and which he must ultimately solve for himself. Although the embodiment of these principles in Sunday-school practice is far from complete, and even unanimity of opinion upon them is not quite attained, they yet represent the main trend of thought and effort in the Sunday-schools of the new movement.

<sup>21</sup> There is an admirable discussion of this point in Blow's *Educational Issues* (1909), chap. iii.

And they mean, especially the last one, that the church must risk its creed for the sake of making it effective over the whole range of life. The sort of instruction in the creed which cramps and narrows the intelligence, binding it to forms, producing faithful but unreasoning followers, must be abandoned. The church must not seek primarily to increase through the Sunday-school the number of its adherents, but to make life more significant to those it now trains and to render them more intelligently loyal to ideals. If it will thus deliberately lose its own life,<sup>1</sup> can it be doubted that it shall find it?

*RELIGION AND SOCIALISM*

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## I

That a coöperative commonwealth is on the way, it would be rash to assert; but that forces tending in such a direction are gathering strength is even more evident in England and on the continent of Europe than with us. While discussions of socialist theory on economic and political lines increase and multiply, another line of thought suggests itself to people preëminently interested in the spiritual rather than in the economic conditions of the race. Supposing a socialist organization of society realized, what would be the reaction on the ethical and religious consciousness,—on creed, on worship, on conduct?

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a few points on the second of these themes,—the probable future of religion under socialism. The subject is less remote from present interests than appears: hypothetical though it be, the attitude of many people toward socialism itself will depend on their conclusions on this point.

Many spectators of the modern drift can see in socialism only "the party of progressive materialism," or, at best, an insidiously dangerous desire to realize brotherhood by machinery. One hears them reiterate the conviction that an inner change alone can help and heal the sorrows of humanity, and that all who care for the Spirit, yet range themselves on the socialist side, are victims of a delusion all the more dangerous for its loftiness, dupes of that very materialism which they think to fight. It is in vain to plead with these critics the obvious identity of the ethics of socialism with those of Christianity. The very fact seems to them a snare to the unwary; for they tell us that the effort to make these ethics function, as it were, automatically,



would, if successful, deprive them of all vitality and power. They see, as Father Hugh Benson saw in his amazing and disconcerting story, *Lord of the World*, an impending conflict in which the forces of evil shall appear under the banner of humanitarianism and freedom, while the armies of the Lord apparently endorse all the sordid miseries and futile strife of the civilization we know, on the plea that the soul can best find itself in a world whose very horrors lead it to distrust the life of nature, and to flee from the temporal to the refuge of eternity.

In the rising struggle that we all must share, critics of this type are persons greatly needed by the socialist fellowship. And this, both because their antagonism helps to prolong the hesitation of the religious world over its bearings, and because the socialist world, as one must freely confess, too often justifies their strictures by confusing the ideologist and the idealist in a common condemnation. Direct argument and prophecy are likely to avail little against this mode of thought; yet, while we wait for experience to do its work, the testimony of those socialists who care supremely for spiritual values, and their groping thoughts on the nature of the new charter which, as they believe, will be presented to religion by the social democracy, ought to be worth giving.

And we have to acknowledge, as a preface, that we face a situation which seems to deliver the case at once to the adversary. For, despite perfunctory statements to the contrary, born of political exigencies, socialism of the more materialistic type habitually implies that it is in itself the religion of the future. Certainly, a large number of its adherents get the effective elements of religion—a power that impels, a hope that sustains, and an emotion that purifies—from their socialist creed. Impatient of the long generations that preached a smug heaven to a proletariat in chains, they are inclined in reaction to deify the flesh and to coin religion from revolt. That ideal of a pacific and fraternal order which socialism holds steadfastly before a civilization helplessly subject to the dominance of licensed greed, is indeed so grateful that we cannot wonder if people contemplating it confound their deep sense of relief and release with the peace that passeth understanding. Though the Roman church

has often proved short-sighted, her flair is keen. Her attacks on socialism mean more than the mere distaste for a party that happens today to be fighting the hierarchy: they imply perception of a rival at the centre, whose promises to satisfy the ageless hunger of the secret heart may prove more alluring than her own.

Yet how evident it is that the promises bear really no relation to the hunger! True, socialism derives part of its strength from the prospect it holds forth of realizing in a measure here on earth that "Civitas Dei" toward which human vision ever strains. True, its power is reinforced by the fact that it first supplied the need for ideal passion in a century when theological and mystical interests were driven into far recesses by the ardor of scientific advance, and the quest for outward prosperity. But no theory nor system of purely human relations can, in the long run, offer a religion. In vain did Leigh Hunt say to Shelley that humanity would find its true religion when charity supplanted faith as a working force. In vain does that fine spirit, John Spargo, writing on *The Spiritual Significance of Socialism*, tacitly assume—with how many others—that fraternal feeling translated into life is the Omega as it is the Alpha of the religious consciousness. The burden of proof rests on the school of these thinkers, not on those of us who follow the evidence of all human history in holding that the love of the brother seen does but spur man on to the love of the Unseen God. Beyond the Alps lies Italy. The listening ear of the race can never cease to hearken to a Voice that speaks out of the silences beyond the range of time and sense. The relation of economic and social forces to the travail of the soul is, we freely admit, more intimate and fundamental than pre-modern thought surmised; yet spiritual activity is the blossoming of humanity's garden,—at once the end of all enrichment of soil and culture of root, and the promise and parent of what fruit the race has to present.

As our thought continues, let us mean by religion the conscious relation of man to a Life and Love "present and yet Beyond"; "sustaining the world by the immanence of His Will, and transcending the world by the glory of His Being."<sup>1</sup> The twentieth

<sup>1</sup>"Credo," Hibbert Journal, April, 1909.

century is assuredly bringing reinforcements to the convictions of those who believe that religion in this sense will always be essential to peace and progress. The brief interval of indifference, lasting a trifle of two centuries, is over: at its height it was partial. Did not the eighteenth century produce William Law and the Wesleys? Is not Chesterton right in claiming that the doubt of the Victorian age was as faithful as its faith was doubtful? As this new century sweeps us on with one of those accelerated movements in history of which the pace is dizzying, we cannot ignore the fact that religious passion plays an essential rôle among the forces that lead toward the future.

## II

The path on which society is impelled is the resultant of complex forces; no one who isolates a single phenomenon, even so great as socialism, can rightly apprehend its direction. Intelligently to enquire into the reaction of the rising social democracy on religion, we must view the situation of the Western world as a whole. If we do so, we find two other phenomena, equal in dramatic quality to the impending economic change. One is the advance of Western science, the other the influence of Eastern thought.

Sixty years ago science was, to the popular mind, endorsing materialism; today, it is enhancing mysticism. As the modern scientist presses nearer the ever-fleeing realities, the regions into which they lead him look awesomely strange. Material and immaterial are terms that threaten to lose significance; we may venture to say that the theological dogmatizing of our grandfathers was no farther from our more generous religion than the instinctive scepticisms of nineteenth-century science from the reverent expectancy of science today.

Meantime, the treasures of the Orient and of the Occident are blending. Racial immobility is at an end. The East opens her arms, perforce or no, to the eager onrush of the West, and, while she zealously studies our scientific acquirements and tries to adopt our scientific methods, we, on our side, begin to meditate

in amazed humility upon that ancient philosophic wisdom which she has preserved intact.

The rising passion for social reconstruction, the advance of science, the new fellowship between East and West,—is it by accident that these three forces are at play on Western civilization at the same time? It seems more likely that the future will discern among the three some necessary relation. Sixteenth-century scholars absorbed in Greek manuscripts were probably not over-much concerned with the reports of adventurers from far untraversed lands; nor were men of either type necessarily excited over the struggle for religious freedom in Germany. Yet scholar, discoverer, reformer, were parts of one movement of expansion, and we see today how the revival of letters combined with the new geography and with the Reformation to produce that bright new civilization before which feudalism fled like a vanishing cloud.

Many are pointing out the significance of the new alliance between Western science and Eastern philosophy; the bearing of both on social reconstruction is less in evidence. Yet in regard to the relations of science and socialism, it is in the first place a truism to recall that only when evolutionary law was applied to social progress could the modern socialist theory arise; and it is obvious in the second place that the tormenting problems of providing for the physical welfare of the race could only be solved in a socialist sense in an age that was swiftly subduing natural forces to human service. In other finer ways also science delivers us from the utopian and reactionary temper common to earlier socialists. Building on Plato, these noble dreamers invented imaginary communities to be arbitrarily imposed on a natural order unrelated or antagonistic. That spiritualizing and refining of our conception of the natural world, that intuition of unity between outward and inward with which science is now busy, gives us a new point of view. It reconciles us to nature; and so helps us to form the ideal of a socialist state which, because it will be in a sense a natural product, will prove an appropriate vehicle of expression to a race whose intimacies with the visible universe are to be closer and more subtle than the past has known.



And, if we are wise, we must begin to discern a still more startling meaning in the thirsty gaze which men begin to turn toward the founts of Eastern wisdom. Can it be without significance that even while the Western world suffers the birth-pangs of the new coöperative order, it begins to realize for the first time the spiritual treasures harbored by civilizations which through long ages we have despised?

“The East bowed low before the blast  
In patient, deep disdain:  
She let the legions thunder past,  
Then plunged in thought again”—

not alone for her own sake, surely. In the great Providence that rules the destinies of the peoples, East and West are meeting at the exact moment when the vista opens of a society gradually evolving so high a degree of industrial peace and social justice that spirit may seek for Spirit, driven back no longer on pressing anxieties or clamorous compassions. The great gift of the Orient is an ever-present sense of the Eternal. The heyday of competition, intoxicated with its own unlovely successes, would have scouted this gift as absurd. In a community in which material production, being socially organized, no longer absorbs attention, its influence may well be healthful, pertinent, and deep. We can easily imagine the religious historians of the socialist state noting with delight the special preparation of the West, by drastic changes in the social order, to receive what the more contemplative races have to offer.

Does some ingenious person threaten us at this point with the danger of sinking like the Orient into an ageless dream? It is amusing to picture Europe and the United States in this connection! We may trust to the very temperament of the West, to the growing call to the adventures of science, to the unrelaxing industrial disciplines of the socialist state, for our protection. Indeed, the passion of the new society for activity and efficient achievement is likely enough to need supplementing. What social order has ever yet offered equal incentive to vigorous interest in the phenomenal world and ardent search for the reality behind phenomena? Noble action and noble contem-

plation have seldom indeed flourished together. Yet both are essential to fulness of life. In the thoughtful words of Baron von Hügel:<sup>2</sup> "The movement of the Christian life is not a circle round a single centre,—detachment,—but an ellipse round two centres, detachment and attachment. And precisely in the difficult but immensely fruitful oscillation and rhythm between the two poles of the spiritual life, in this fleeing and seeking, and not in either of these two movements taken alone, consists the completeness and culmination of Christianity." And, we may add, of religion. We have good reason to hope that the new society will offer the most favorable conditions yet found for this "fruitful oscillation." The socialist state, intent on far-sighted organization of the greater industries, and on conquest of the material resources of the globe, is not likely to weaken in that "attachment" which has always marked civilization in the West; yet the release from nervous strain, and the tranquillity that it should ensure, may well foster the correlative increase of those powers of detachment which have been the specialty of mystics in those ancient lands where the spirit gazes, more fixedly than we are wont to do, on the countenance of Truth. No one can calculate the depth and worth that may accrue to the influences of the East in a socialist state. To these influences we well may look to counteract the temptation to a new hedonism, to acquiescence in a natural life all too pleasant to lure the spirit on, which we may predict as the special peril of a social democracy.

### III

A coöperative Society, gaining a continually greater insight into natural law and greater control over natural forces, while at the same time it is free from racial or national provincialism and is open to influences from all quarters of the globe: here, then, is the scene in which the spiritual drama of the future must be played. But before we try to forecast the drama, let us pause a moment more to consider the contrast the atmosphere of that time will present to our own.

<sup>2</sup> *The Mystical Element in Religion.*

Were it ours to read the secrets of that vast psychical activity which is coextensive with history, we should not be surprised to find that religion in the sense in which we have defined it, the direct experience by the spirit of man of the Spirit of God, has been fainter during the last two centuries than at any preceding time in Christian story. If we may trust the records of the inner life, an immediate consciousness of God—let us use the great term in all simplicity—was far more common in the twelfth, thirteenth, or seventeenth, century than it is today.

Such a statement must of course be hazarded with full knowledge of its unverifiable nature. But even very devout people who live much in prayer now habitually confess with sorrow that this consciousness is rarely attained. The sense of loss so common among the Victorians pointed to a real desolation:

“He is not risen, no!  
He lies and moulders low!  
Christ is not risen!”

For one who expressed it, many must have felt, many continue to feel, this hidden tragedy. “Doubtless thou art a God that hidest thyself,” is the deep cry of the age.

This prevalent blindness and blankness has been assigned to various causes. Is it fantastic to ascribe it in part to the miasma that rises from the industrial condition of the masses, crushed and stifled under the brutalizing influences of the competitive system? Religion, with all its privacy, is not only the most personal, but the most social, of phenomena: the spiritual atmosphere is as all-pervading as the physical, and is equally sensitive to social pollution. The spiritual exhalations of our vulgar and cruel democracy have accurately corresponded to the physical, and are equally noxious. Where there is keen economic distress, religion is always overclouded. Some men will be drawn to sheer revolt, others dominated by physical depletion. Others still, including the finest spirits, will find an all-engrossing religion in the service of the sick and sorry. But between all men and the heavens will rise a dim and vaporous pall, impalpably thin, impenetrably dusky, like the veil of smoke belched forth by the myriad chimneys of a manufacturing town. To be sure, the

stars can be discerned through the murk. Even the dweller in a modern city may rejoice in the ceaseless pageant of day and night that silently envelops our shrieking human activities. But let him escape from the town, and rest on some low headland, over the lapping waters of the Atlantic, where the breeze blows salt and clean, and shadows lie purple on the green shallows of the bay,—where the sky is the real blue that nature meant, softened only by low lines of half-invisible cloud-pearls at the horizon; he will rediscover a new heaven that will perhaps give him a promise of a new earth. It is not in cities that modern astronomers build their towers.

We modern folk are likely to be increasingly a race of city-dwellers; but good hopes are held out to us that the cities of the future may be smokeless. There are equally valid reasons for believing that the social democracy will clear the spiritual air. The firm disciplines which will press on all men may not in themselves tend to heavenly-mindedness; but they must develop such serviceable qualities of self-subordination and regulated capacity as should form an excellent preliminary to the graces and activities of the soul. The noble emphasis on the charities and the sympathies, which now distracts men from higher religious aspirations, will fall into subordinate harmony; and the race we seek to create, heirs of a fine liberty social rather than individualistic, freemen because bound in ordered service, will possess powers no longer preëmpted by lower needs. Doubtless, the relief from the sharp pressure of the economic struggle will afford a snare to the spiritually indolent; just as surely it will afford an opportunity to those who are spiritually inclined. No sensible man looks forward to a time when religion will be easy; the perils that the soul must encounter will be no less dramatic and dangerous in the future than in the past. But the struggle will be carried on under clearer skies than now. Already we can discern a rift in the vapors; and perhaps it may be granted to our children, or, if not to them, to our grandchildren, to see the whole sullen fog-bank that blocks our vision, roll triumphantly away.



## IV

We may without fatuity, then, regard that comparative social justice, to attain which all our best powers today are bent, not as an end in itself, but as the preface to a higher religious evolution. And we are ready to ask,—What types of religious life are likely to obtain in the socialist state?

To English readers, at least, the question presents itself under three aspects: the future of religion at large; the probable future of Christianity; and the possible fate of the forms of Christianity, in particular of the two great divisions, Protestantism and Catholicism. The present paper deals with the first of these, only, the other two being treated elsewhere. To be of any value the discussion must be frankly personal. One can only present these matters from his own angle of vision, basing his answers carefully on his perception of the new spiritual life already pushing its restless way toward the light, no less than on forecasts of growth in the new order.

The larger religious future is inevitably bound up with three questions. Will religion be a matter of dogma, or of intuition and unformulated sentiment? Will it hold to its belief in a personal God? What will be its attitude toward death and immortality?

1. The present reaction against dogma is a very complex affair. Our wide-spread distaste is determined somewhat by our pleasure in our own escape from bigotry, somewhat by a genuine broadening of sympathies and a quickened perception of the degree to which religion is conditioned by social growth and of the relative nature of religious formulae. But with these healthy and right instincts blend others which might inspire us with less complacency. A certain haziness and laziness in thinking have been the natural concomitant of that deep and subtle materializing of our inner life consequent on our commercial civilization. The blight that has rested on the general religious consciousness during the modern epoch, may be, at least in part, responsible for the reluctance of people to adhere with any ardor to old creeds or to evolve new ones. For, after all, religious dogma only rep-

resents man thinking, and thinking on those high themes concerning which indifference is unnatural. His thoughts have not been tedious nor puerile nor empty: they have been noble, lofty, and profound. If it is unfortunate to cling to one's thought on Unseen Mysteries and our relations to them as final, it is also unfortunate to refuse to think at all. Victorian agnosticism only too often masked its indolence or discouragement as reverence, and represented simply an intellectual cowardice where it thought to achieve a philosophic depth. The dogmatizing ages were great and glorious ages in the history of the mind. We may hope to have escaped permanently the evil by-products of their ardors, —religious persecutions and spiritual arrogance; but in times of greater intellectual leisure and freedom it is quite probable that, while retaining the precious heritage of broad sympathies which the closing age bequeaths, we may also revive that passion for high spiritual adventure, that audacious yet worshipful endeavor to translate the elusive experiences of the spirit into terms that shall fix them as social possessions, which marked the great ages of faith and of the creeds.

Will these creeds be the old creeds, rediscovered, reasserted? Will they be new ones, inconceivable to us at present? Such questions no one can answer. We notice on the one hand in all modern religious movements, Catholic and Protestant, the striking revival of an instinct of continuity. Iconoclasm is no longer valued for its own sake; the escape from old shackles intoxicates no more. It is safe to predict that reverence for tradition will continue to increase, and that the creeds of the future will bear an organic relation to those of the past. Yet while the religious consciousness is, in one sense, permanent, it is, in another, constantly progressive. To press on bravely, reverently, seeking to reconcile loyalty with courage, in the new reaches of life that await us, is a duty arduous enough to preserve the future race from complacency, and to stimulate that ceaseless labor of the mind which is at once agony and life.

One guiding principle is plain. Thought is constrained today, whether it will or no, to place new emphasis on the human side of religious evolution, and to perceive the large measure of control exercised by social and economic conditions over religious

formulae. Disinterested scholarship has no more vital task before it than to analyze and follow this control. To call faith the mirror of life would be inaccurate; but at least that far glory on which the eyes of faith are ever fixed is seen by men through the life they share and of which they are the product. The time has come for even the most orthodox to accept this point of view boldly, and to recognize that, whatever happens to formulae, concepts change from age to age, such change being largely, though obscurely, determined by the characteristics of the social structure. Now humanity has never yet realized itself as a social democracy, and we may be sure that whatever may be the fate of religion in the socialist state new experiences are awaiting it.

In thus acknowledging the power of social institutions to control, if not to generate religious ideas, we must not be thought necessarily to imply a purely human origin for religion. Religion itself is not born from below, but from above. Of this that ultimate criterion of knowledge, the experience of the race, assures us even more clearly than metaphysical enquiries. All positive definitions and intuitions of spiritual truth have pointed to a great Reality. This confidence protects and reassures us in days when thoughts of process too often overpower those of ultimate origin. Formulae alter, theologies change, determined largely by the phases of social growth; yet they are all alike attempts, not to give a body to illusion, but to portray experienced fact. Once assured of this, the soul can rest secure, however winds may strain and waves may rage. Religion has from the first been no mere translation of desire into metaphor; it has been the progressive effort, less crude as the generations pass, to describe experience. This experience deepens and widens through the ages, and formulae slowly follow experience, but the "God, Creation's secret Force," is forever, "Himself Unmoved, all motion's Source," and through all groping and temporary obscuration we move ever nearer to the Uncreated Light.

2. A profound religious transformation must then accompany every social transformation. Nowhere is this law more evident than in regard to the greatest of all objects of human thought,

the conception of Deity. We see with increasing clearness that the great word, God, greatest that mankind has ever uttered, connotes a different concept in every age. The God of nomadic tribes is a tribal chieftain. The God of feudalism, as imaged in the superb mosaic that overlooks ruined Messina from the fallen glory of its shrine, is a masterful feudal overlord. That this conception of ultimate being will be deeply, if subtly, affected by the social forms of the future till it assumes a character which we can only dimly predict, is indubitable. How then are men likely to think of God in the socialist state? Shall we be able still to use the dear forms and emotions of childhood? May we retain the idea of Personality as an attribute of the Informing Spirit of the world?

No question is more crucial, none more unanswerable. Yet we may gain pregnant hints from the life we know. For democracy is already affecting as deeply as it is unconsciously the general conception of God. Looking within, we are aware that to us the Final Reality that controls the secret thought is no distant Monarch, the natural Ruler of a world aristocratically organized, but a pervading Spirit, so manifest in the life of Nature and the social whole that it is easy to confuse Him with that very world which He inspires. Immanental rather than transcendental ideas of Deity have proved the natural product of modern life. They rose unmistakably coincident with the rise of democratic feeling, its earliest correlative and its crowning glory, overpowering formal creeds in the mind even of so orthodox a poet as Wordsworth, and supplementing all other religious conceptions to a Shelley or a Rousseau; and they are rising still to ever greater dominance. Now socialism is simply democracy coming to its own, and is certain to strengthen rather than to weaken the intuition of the Immanent God. This intuition, native to our social forms, is already emphasized by the influx of pantheistic ideas from the East and by the recent suggestions of science. Realizing how deeply the civilization to be will be penetrated by these influences, it is safe to predict that in the socialist state, an intensified form of the modern faith in a God revealed through His universe rather than apart from it, manifested in all that we in our ignorance call impersonal as well



as in our human consciousness, will be a vital, illuminating, and sustaining mode of thought among the devoutly disposed.

If even in the individualistic democracy we know, despite the image of scrambling egotisms which, taken in the mass, it presents, immanential ideas of God thus keep pace with the growth of mystical feeling for the social whole, we must believe that these ideas will increasingly prevail as democracy becomes slowly transformed from an individualistic to a social type, and shows an harmoniously ordered unity in which thought may easily discern the reflection and working of a Divine Life. Yet we must beware of thinking that this is the whole story. The conception of a God "sustaining the world by the immanence of His Will" is certain to grow clearer: it would be rash to assert that the other conception of One who "transcends the world in the glory of His Being" will necessarily fade away. For we cannot question that in modern society the sense of personality is constantly growing more acute. Democracy from its birth had a marvellous perception of the glory and significance of the individual; this perception is starting-point and foundation of that collective ideal which is coming to dominate our thought. At the outset of the democratic period the piercing accents of Blake, summing up all that the most daring anthropomorphism could express, leave us breathless:

"Thou art a man: God is no more:  
Thine own humanity learn to adore."

From Emerson to Browning the lesson has been reëchoed in exaltation. As democracy develops, this feeling for the miracle of personality is likely to deepen. If socialism, by enhancing the common consciousness and emphasizing collective action, withdraws, as it well may do, some props round which the separatist ideal of life has twined, it will, none the less, if only from the fact that it will mark the highest stage yet of social evolution, teach us to value and experience the mystery of our own being as never before. The larger freedom for individual development toward which we look when our brutalizing conditions shall have yielded to a more generous fostering of human aptitudes, will inevitably bring with it a growing delight in that diversity of

character which is, so far as we know, the last triumph, as it is the last mystery, of the universe. However much farther the analysis of multiple personality may be carried, the man must always remain one, and finally the only, actor in his own inner world. Self-consciousness, which has become infinitely deeper and more intricate since the days of Homer, will become continually more intense and subtle: known by each man in himself, inferred by him in others, it will remain while he lives, if not when he thinks, the surest fact on his horizon. Now, no matter what wide reaches of unsounded being alien or akin to his own man may dimly discern in the Infinite, he can never exclude from that Infinite the highest and surest mode of existence that he knows. Still spirit will seek to meet with Spirit; and, after all, to protect the possibility of that meeting was all which the theologians ever meant with their insistence on the much-battered, largely misunderstood, highly unsatisfactory, and wholly indispensable term, a personal God.

That the very conception of personality, whether human or divine, is, however, to be immensely enlarged and enriched, partly through the advance of psychology, partly through a widening social experience, partly through new insight into the spiritual life of nature, we cannot doubt. Not without meaning is symbol the synonym for creed. The symbol for Infinite Reality cherished by the coöperative commonwealth must contain a wider majesty than is known today. We are not likely to apprehend God more intensely than the Psalmist or St. Augustine: in dwelling on the evolutionary aspects of religion we must not forget that it is in one sense the most static of phenomena, enabling us more than aught else in history to measure our own littleness and the slowness of our advance. But though we may not feel more intensely, that which we feel will be more in accordance with the depths of the riches of the unsearchable Being of God. Forms of religious thought are the final test of every civilization: in the new society, the Voice of the Beloved, speaking to the disciple as it has spoken from the beginning, will rise from regions of consciousness before unsounded, and echo from a range of experience coextensive with a universe ever more holy because ever more alive. Those social conceptions

which are already so intimately affecting the springs of thought, must, when perfected, lead to religious conceptions in which ideas of transcendence and immanence may be at least partially fused, and which will be as far removed from the empty monotheism of the eighteenth century or the lower ranges of Unitarianism as from the crass tritheism of current orthodoxy. Orient and Occident will contribute to the idea. The God of the East is perceived from the vast silences of Nature: the God of the future democracy must rather be the God of them that dwell in cities. Yet if we are really to build "in England's green and pleasant land" a nearer image than heretofore of the "Civitas Dei," it may well be that the heavens and He that dwelleth therein shall be as well discerned from its streets thronged with comrades as from the lonely sweep of the desert or the peaks of farthest Himalay. Of one thing we may be sure: no ideal that bearing the test of time and social change has proved permanently life-giving, will ever be discarded from religious concepts. And among such ideals we must give first rank to faith in a God who forever assures his creatures that before they call he will answer, and while they are yet speaking he will hear.

3. What, let us ask in brief conclusion, will be the attitude of the future toward Death and Immortality? One foresees men divided into varying groups and schools. As life grows sweeter and this world more dear, horror of departure may be intensified and Death may play with new poignancy his rôle as King of Terrors. Modern theories, however, if verified, offer help and consolation. For longevity may be prolonged till the signal to depart is grateful. When the term of natural life, which we are told is now never reached, shall be generally attained, cessation may be as gentle as the fall of the leaf, as much desired as sleep after a long and joyous day.

But how imagine men incurious concerning the awakening? Surely no development or refinement of resources can ever make this world other than an inn, a resting-place, to the nobly tempered soul. Many motives interplay to create the desire for immortality. Among these it is quite conceivable that the mere longing for physical continuance, now natural to a healthy organism, may weaken; but revolt against separation from loved

ones, hatred at leaving unfinished tasks, and indeed the sheer dramatic passion for living, are not likely to fade. An impulse different from all these is, however, at the heart of the craving for immortality. This is the desire of the God-intoxicated for the unveiled vision of Him seen darkly here through the glass of nature and humanity; but there, if the Apostle be trusted, face to face.

It is strange and startling to note how currently the craving for a life to come is discussed today apart from any question of faith in God. Even so reverent a thinker as Mr. Lowes Dickinson speaks in his Ingersoll lecture as if the desire that the Good may be strengthened and more knowledge attained were our noblest incentive to hope for immortality. But thought of this type can never satisfy. It follows the disastrous advice of the Boyg to Peer Gynt, and "goes round about," till the very point and centre is never reached. If separated from interest in our relation to a living God, speculations concerning immortality would have run a course quite different from the fact. The noblest Christian men and women have always desired to survive death chiefly that they might see his countenance. What are all other desires compared to this? It is no verbal invention; it has been, to chosen spirits, a controlling fact for nearly two thousand years. True, not all men experience it; but neither do all men respond to the motives of Mr. Lowes Dickinson. What reason is there for supposing that it will weaken as time goes on? No quickening intuition of the divine present in the natural order, no rise of pantheistic passion, can ever satisfy the longing for unhampered and perfect fellowship with Him who was "before all worlds." As Herbert Spencer pointed out, our contact with unknown mystery constantly widens with the increase of the circumference of our knowledge. The more the circle expands, the more will be our need to escape from all relation to "the wheel" of phenomena into conscious union with the Uncreated and the Unconfined. The craving for the beatific vision will never die. If reincarnations must multiply before it be attained,—and this view is sure to gain vogue as Eastern influences increase,—why, death will be the portal to another stage in the long pilgrimage. If



the older Christian orthodoxies persist, death will be the signal for the plunge into those purifying fires which, as believed by Dante, by Catherine of Genoa, by the Catholic world at large, do darkly reveal to the soul the light of the countenance of God. Shrinking from death and longing for death—variously motivated, functioning on various planes—will then coexist in the future as they do today. Speculations concerning immortality may quite conceivably be merged in a clearer knowledge than we now possess; but however this may be, the “*Vera Patria*” will always shed its light upward from beneath the horizon, and the dream of its glories will continue to summon men to nobler and sterner living in the midst of the allurements of a world fairer than the one we know.

*THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA  
EXCAVATIONS OF 1909<sup>1</sup>*

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I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISRAELITE PALACE

The excavations of the Harvard Palestinian Expedition at Samaria in 1909 have revealed for the first time the plan and the masonry of a royal Israelite palace. The view thus given of the material resources and technical skill at the command of the kings of Israel is so enlightening for the history of Palestine that the identification of the palace becomes the point of paramount interest. It must be recorded at once that we have not found a line of Hebrew inscription anywhere in the building, nor have our excavations given us the name of any of the kings of Israel. The identification rests entirely on archaeological grounds; but these, though simple, are direct and clear.

The hill on which stands the modern town of Sebastiya<sup>2</sup> is quite certainly the hill of Samaria bought by Omri from Shemer for two talents of silver. The chief events in the history of the hill, which are linked together by references in historical documents to complete the identification, are as follows:—

*Israelite Period*

1. Purchase of the hill by Omri and construction of a town called Shomerôn (Samaria). This presupposes the construction of a royal palace. Ca. 900 B.C. 1 Kings 16 24.

2. Construction of a temple to Baal and of an "ivory palace" by Ahab. 1 Kings 16 32, 22 39.

<sup>1</sup> Abridged from a fuller preliminary report which, it is expected, will soon be published with plans and illustration. For an account of the work of the Expedition in 1908, see HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for January, 1909.

<sup>2</sup> The local pronunciation is *Sebústi*.

3. Continued occupation of the site as the capital of Israel down to 722 B.C. 1 Kings 22 to 2 Kings 18.

4. Capture of Samaria by Sargon and transportation of 27,290 of the people of Israel to Assyria. The rest of the people left in Samaria under an Assyrian governor. 722 B.C. 2 Kings 17 6, 18 9. Sargon, *Prunkinschrift*, 23-25; *Annals*.

### *Babylonian Period*

5. Establishment of Babylonian colonists at Samaria by Sargon and Esarhaddon. This presupposes the building of houses and fortifications. Ca. 720-670 B.C. References as in preceding section.

6. Capture of Samaria by assault by Alexander the Great. 331 B.C. For references to Diodorus Siculus etc., see Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 347.

### *Greek Period*

7. Establishment of a Syro-Macedonian colony and reconstruction of the fortifications.<sup>3</sup> 331 B.C.

8. Destruction of Samaria by John Hyrcanus. 109 B.C. Josephus, *Antiq.* xiii. 10 2, 3; *Wars* i. 2 7.

9. For the rest of the Seleucid-Maccabaeen period the town remained a ruin and apparently nearly uninhabited. 109-60 B.C. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 5 3.

### *Roman Period*

10. Restored to its inhabitants by Pompey; rebuilt and resettled by Gabinius. 60 B.C. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 4 4, 5 3; *Wars* i. 7 7, 8 4.

11. Rebuilt by Herod and named Sebaste. 30-1 B.C. Josephus, *Antiq.* xv. 8 5; *Wars* ii. 21 2.

Thus the site has probably never been entirely deserted, and it has lain in ruins for only two short periods, the first just after the Assyrian deportation and the second during the forty-nine

<sup>3</sup> The walls appear to have been broken thrice and rebuilt between 332 and 306 B.C.

years subsequent to the destruction of the city by John Hyrcanus. The name Samaria clung to the place until Herod changed it to Sebaste, and the name Sebaste is still that of the native village on the eastern flank of the hill. Furthermore, the known data as to the occupation of the hill of Samaria give us six periods of construction, from the purchase by Omri to the works of Herod, for the principal buildings on the hill.

Of these periods the last, the magnificent city built by Herod "for his own security and as a monument of his magnificence,"<sup>4</sup> is easily identifiable. The forum, at the modern threshing floor, with its basilica and other buildings not yet excavated; the road of columns leading around the hill to the forum; the ornamental gate, oriented, unlike the underlying older gates, to lead straight into the road of columns; the great outer wall "twenty stadii in circumference"; and the hippodrome in the hollow on the north of the forum,—all are coherent parts of the same unified plan, and show the same masonry and architectural forms. The inscriptions found, the coins, the pottery, and the architectural forms show conclusively that this group of structures belongs to the period of the early Roman Empire and must therefore be the city of Sebaste built by Herod; that the buildings were repaired and altered about the time of Septimius Severus; and that they ceased to be used soon after the death of Constantine the Great. To this group of buildings must be added the great temple which stands on the top of the hill and agrees exactly with Josephus's description of the Herodian temple to Augustus:—

Now within and about the middle of it [Sebaste] he built a sacred place, of a furlong and a half [in circuit] and adorned it with all sorts of decorations, and therein erected a temple, which was illustrious on account of both its largeness and its beauty.<sup>5</sup> . . . In the midst of this city, thus built, [he] had erected a very large temple to Caesar Augustus.<sup>6</sup>

Here the great marble statue of a Roman emperor, the dedicatory stelae, the coins, and the details of construction tell the same story of Herodian origin and later Roman restoration.

Thus the Herodian structures, clearly identified, form the point

<sup>4</sup> Josephus, *Antiq.* xv. 8 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Antiq.* xv. 8 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Wars* i. 21 2.



of departure for dating all the underlying older structures. These underlying older structures are themselves so built one over the other that their relative order is beyond dispute, as follows:—

1. The latest pre-herodian buildings appear to be the miserable cave-dwellings on the southern edge of the lower terrace at the summit (dated by coins) and the outer, square, retaining wall at the gateway (dated by position relative to Herod's gate).

2. The uppermost pre-herodian buildings under the temple form a complex of houses dated to about 125 B.C. by coins found above and below the floors. These are, no doubt, houses of that Samaria which John Hyrcanus destroyed in 109 B.C.

3. Underneath the houses just mentioned are remnants of at least two older complexes of houses which are thus clearly previous to 125 B.C. in date. Beyond the temple area on both sides and on the lower terrace, the same two or three older complexes are clearly distinguishable. Here fragments of red-figured ware and other Greek pottery carry the date back to about 400 B.C. At the gateway, under the towers of the Gabinius-Herod gate, lies a gateway of known Greek form—two square towers with a circular building behind, probably the gate built by the colony of Alexander the Great.

4. At the summit, underneath the Greek walls, there are traces of mud-brick structures and of a very thick fort-wall of stones, the same fort-wall being found also at the gateway. This wall, in spite of the great number of large stones available in the ruins of older buildings, is built of small stones in a manner characteristic of ancient, in fact of Babylonian, brick-work. In the filling of the construction-trench in which it is built were Israelite potsherds and a fragment of a cuneiform tablet.

5. Below the Herodian walls at the summit, even where they are carried to the greatest depth, below all Greek walls, below the Babylonian walls wherever found, there is a series of massive walls beautifully built of large limestone blocks founded on rock and forming part of one great building.

Thus we come to the other end of the chronological series of buildings on the summit—a single great building founded on the rock. This building, consisting of great open courts surrounded by small rooms, comparable in plan and even in size with the

Babylonian palaces, is certainly royal in size and architecture. The rocky slopes of the hill are scarred with quarry-cuts in some of which the blocks of stone remain undetached from the rock below. These blocks are identical in size and in stone with the blocks used in the palace. The rock has everywhere been dressed to receive the palace walls, and there is no trace of any sort of earlier buildings. The site is the very summit of the hill—the foremost building site—the only conceivable site for a palace-fortress such as Omri and Ahab must have built. A royal building, the first built on the primary building site of the hill of Samaria, can only be the palace of the Israelite kings.

This palace shows three distinct periods of construction. The latest, poor in every way, is represented by insignificant alterations which cannot at present be further identified. The second period is represented by a very great increase in the size of the palace down the western and southern slopes of the hill where we have found the outside walls. The masonry of this period shows finer joints, smoother surfaces, and better building than that of the first period. This extension is built against and joined with the earlier palace, and in places covers its quarries. The earliest part of the palace occupies a knoll of rock at the very summit, whose western side has been cut away to a vertical face about two metres high, and, extending eastward under the part of the hill still unexcavated, is as yet of unknown extent. The masonry is more massive and less finished than that of the second period. I think there can be no doubt that this central core of the palace was built by Omri; and provisionally, until further proof is available, I have ascribed the great addition on the west and south to Ahab. There is no mention in the Book of Kings of any other ruler of Israel who built great buildings at Samaria.

On the surface of the rock, in some cases under the walls of the Omri palace, there are oil cups, circular receptacles, and shallow troughs such as are found all over Palestine. These are pre-israelite and show that the hill-top was probably a bare rock when Omri bought it.

## II. THE EXCAVATIONS

The arrival of the expedition at Sebaste was delayed by the reactionary revolution in Constantinople which broke out on April 13. On May 1, however, Mr. Fisher and I with thirty-five trained Egyptian workmen left Egypt for Palestine, and we arrived at Sebaste on May 7. After further delays the work began on May 31 and continued steadily until November 4, six days' holidays, a few rainy days in October, and the weekly day of rest being the only interruptions.

Efforts to secure a classical archaeologist or another architect having failed, the entire direction and registration of the work was carried on by Mr. Fisher and myself. The photographic record was made by my staff of Egyptians, one of whom, assisted by a local Christian schoolmaster, relieved me of a great part of the work of time-keeping and accounts, while the efficiency of others made the work of oversight comparatively easy. The commissioner of the Imperial Ottoman Museum, Mahmud Shawket Effendi el-Khalidi, of Jerusalem, was of the greatest service, and exerted himself in every way for the success of the work.

The local force consisted of from 230 to 260 persons, men, boys, women, and girls. A higher rate of wages was paid to these people than is usual in the district, with two objects, to secure the same persons day after day and so train them to the work, and to make it possible to demand more work of them than was customary. The results more than justified this measure.

The workmen were divided into nine gangs varying in size from twenty to thirty-five persons, and each gang was in charge of three Egyptians who worked with pick and hoe alongside their men. Other Egyptians were detailed to look after the lines of carriers and direct the dumping, and a special gang of twelve men was told off to move stones and build retaining walls. Any area marked for excavation was divided into sections about seven by ten metres in size, and each gang was assigned a section, the Egyptians being made responsible for the proper excavation of the section.

The registration of the work was made by means of the following records: (1) A journal, with additional notes written up at intervals. (2) Plans and sections on a scale of 1 : 50, with notes and drawings of details. (3) A photographic record of each stage of the excavations, showing details of masonry, and the objects found. This record contains about 1200 negatives, of three sizes, all numbered and registered in a book with full details. (4) A card catalogue of objects found, with a card for each object, giving number, provenance, date, and full description of material, size, and condition, a photograph, and, when desirable, a drawing as well. For the season this catalogue contains 2027 cards.

At first an attempt was made to remove the *débris* layer by layer, but this was soon found to be impossible, for beneath the cultivation stratum there were no regular horizontal strata. The *débris* of each period had been disturbed during the construction of the next architectural period in the search for stone for building material and in the effort to place the new foundations on rock: hence foundations of all periods rested on the rock and stood mixed together—a wilderness of walls. Moreover, certain areas, in one case over 100 square metres in extent, have been disturbed in Christian-Moslem times in the search for building material, the holes in many cases being cut down to solid rock and most of them being subsequently filled in to restore the ground to cultivation. These filled holes are clearly marked, as the dirt thrown in from one side forms a continuously advancing gravity slope with the stones and pebbles in a series of pockets at the bottom and the finer dirt in thin sloping strata above. In other parts, however, the successive deposition and disturbance of strata proved easily traceable. The undisturbed geological dirt, which remained in places on the rock and in crevices, was the same reddish gravelly soil seen at present on the surrounding hill-tops. Above this a layer of decayed yellow limestone *débris* contained the limestone walls of the Israelite period. The yellow *débris* was cut through by the construction-trenches in which were built the Babylonian and Roman temple walls, and these trenches were filled with black *débris* belonging to the deposits above the yellow. All these deposits above the yellow



limestone débris were dark-colored and indistinguishable in character except that the lowest levels frequently contained patches and pockets of coals, ashes, and burnt material (iron or copper slag). The only means of separating the different periods of the black stratum was to find the floors of the successive structures, but those of the last Seleucid houses (destroyed 109 B.C.) were practically the only floors preserved, and, leaving aside the small objects found, the black débris below them did not differ in constituency from that above. Where a Roman floor was found, as in the temple portico and certain houses on the lower terrace, there was only a cultivation stratum above. This was like all the other black débris—only a little softer and drier.

Once it was clear that regular horizontal strata were not to be expected, the plan was adopted of clearing steadily downwards along the walls until we found an existing floor level or the foot of a superstructure wall; then we cleared along this level. After the first few weeks, the filled holes were completely cleared along with the top stratum from which their filling had come. Finally, with a knowledge of our deposits, which permitted an almost instant recognition of the character and date of the débris, we were able to clear with great consistency—removing cultivation stratum, registering any late field-walls found in this, clearing to the first floor-level, then to the next, and so on, down to the upper surface of the yellow deposit. Lastly the yellow débris was cleared away, and the underlying red earth, where found. On the summit this process was repeated strip by strip over an area of about 6000 square metres.

The excavations begun in 1908 consisted, for the main part, of a series of trenches on the very summit of the hill and at the building which was visible west of the threshing floor. As the main attention was devoted to the summit, the trenches at the "lower temple," as it was temporarily designated, never reached a point which could reveal either the character or the plan of the building. At the summit, the Trench G as originally laid out was intended to cut across the very top of the ancient hill, but we now know that the ancient top lay some metres south of the apparent top. Trench F therefore, instead of cutting across the Israelite palace, laid bare the front part of the large building

identified as Herod's Temple of Augustus. A large marble statue found in front of the temple stairway was recognized as a statue of Augustus. To the west a large vault was found and to the south the trenches revealed certain walls—some of the temple and others not understood. It appears now that the wall of the palace at the summit was laid bare for several Israelite metres, but its importance was scarcely to be recognized at the bottom of a narrow trench.

Coming to the site as it was left at the end of the first season, we decided to continue the attack at these two points, but by clearing large areas, not by trenches. Certain gangs left free at various times were also employed in excavating the gateway known to travellers as the "Leper's Gate." Thus the work was carried on at three points:—the summit, the basilica or threshing floor, and the gateway.

The summit work was carried out in a number of contiguous sections known as Strip 1, etc. On May 31 work was begun on Strip 1, adjoining the Herodian temple on the east. Here a scrap of mosaic pointed to a floor level, and when this level had been cleared so far as preserved, it was seen to belong to a large bathing establishment with furnace, cold and hot baths, and water-closet. These floors in turn were cleared away. About 60 to 100 cm. below there were several trodden surfaces, made by the tread of feet during the construction of walls, but no floors and only foundation walls. The débris was black and mixed with red and black potsherds and other Seleucid fragments. Just above the rock was a thin layer of yellow limestone débris so hard packed that it was mistaken for decayed surface rock. The bath-house, whose floor was two metres below the temple floor, was temporarily assigned to the Roman period, but it was seen later to belong to the Seleucid town destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., and the lower walls were still earlier.

Embedded in the yellow débris were massive walls, founded on the rock, whose importance immediately sprang into notice. They were clearly part of a large and important building. The rock was dressed to receive them, which shows that they were the first walls built on the site. Beside them, the rock bore only the oil cups and other small rock-cut receptacles so common

all over Palestine. If this hill is the hill of Samaria, these walls can only belong to the Israelite period.

On the southern half of Strip 1 everything was in the greatest confusion. There were remnants of Herodian and later Roman walls as well as Greek and Israelite walls, and across the whole ran a heavy wall 4.30 metres wide, built of small stones and called the "Babylonian wall." These had all suffered from the removal of stone and from agricultural terracing.

On July 2, having finished our detailed examination of Strip 1 and the removal of such walls as stood in the way of clearing up the Israelite building, we began cutting out the top stratum of Strip 2. A floor was already visible on the eastern face, and we followed this across the strip from east to west. There was no floor preserved higher than this one, which was 2.75 metres lower than the pavement of the temple-portico excavated last year. It was soon clear that the temple had been built over a group of houses of earlier date, although the foundation walls of the temple cut through the walls of these houses to bed-rock or to the Israelite walls, which were treated by the Herodian builders as equivalent to bed-rock. These houses are the latest pre-herodian buildings on the spot, and they can only be the houses of the Seleucid city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., for the restoration by Gabinius in 60 B.C. was certainly a very incomplete and poverty-stricken thing. As a matter of fact, coins found on their floors are of about 110 to 125 B.C., while those found under the floors are earlier.

Along the southern edge of this strip ran a great wall 7.61 metres high and 2.1 metres thick, which acted as a retaining wall for the great platform on which the temple stood. The details found indicated a rectangular enclosing wall about 310 metres in circumference, a size which agrees very well with Josephus's statement that Herod built an enclosing wall one and one-half stadia in circumference (*Wars* ii. 21 2).

On August 11 work was begun on the lower terrace. The great points revealed here were the Israelite city (or fortress) wall along the edge of the cliff, the paved open space, the southern face of the Israelite palace, the terracing for Greek and Roman houses, and the great enclosing wall of the temple area. Strips

3 and 4, both west of Strip 2, were begun on September 20 and October 18 respectively. In the first of these were again Israelite walls, the continuation of the great Babylonian wall, a Seleucid street with earlier Greek houses underneath, and, high up in the surface débris, remnants of Roman foundations. The eastern part of Strip 4, which is to the north of Strip 3, was occupied by a big Seleucid house. Over the western part there were no walls in the higher levels, and we cleared straight down to the Israelite walls, the rock, or the yellow débris.

The clue to the whole situation at the summit lay in Strip 2, which ran south from the temple-portico found last year to the edge of the summit plateau. It was the exact width of the temple, and gave us first of all the plan of the Herodian temple, consisting of a stairway, a portico, a vestibule, and a cella with a corridor on each side. The temple showed a very definite later reconstruction, and had manifestly been partly destroyed for its stone before this restoration. The restored building approximated the plan of Herod's building, but the wall between vestibule and cella was about 2.50 metres further south and the vestibule itself showed a continuation of the two inner cella walls with thickened ends as if to support pilasters. The older wall showed the characteristic masonry which appears in all Herod's foundation walls, both on the summit and at the basilica, and which differs entirely from that of the reconstructed parts of the temple.

The pavement, as it was found, was certainly post-herodian. The stairway was manifestly built against the portico and was in good condition. The offering stones about the altar all appear to belong to the Severus period and show the floor level of that time, but the floor of the altar is lower, and is in fact 70 cm. below the lowest step of the great stair. It is therefore probable that the altar itself is Herodian, and the stairway of the reconstruction period, but a final decision must await a cut through the stairway.

The reconstruction of the temple was almost certainly made in the time of the Roman legionary colony settled in Sebaste by Septimius Severus about 200 A.D. When the district became Christian, this Roman temple was, no doubt, a place of abhorrence. It is certain that the great Christian buildings were all

at the east of the forum, and that the stone used in them came from older buildings. It is equally clear that the reconstructed temple has been destroyed down to its foundation-walls and lower by the removal of stone. Apparently the summit was never used as a site for large buildings in early Christian times.

On June 1 half the force was put at work on the "lower temple." Here three strata of earth were distinctly visible, all sloping to the east. These were removed, and the plan of the building thus laid bare was seen to be neither a temple nor a church, but a true basilica, consisting of a large open, stone-paved court surrounded by a colonnade with a mosaic floor. On the north was an apse-like amphitheatre. This basilica adjoined the forum, and was connected with it by a wide doorway through the eastern side of the court. Of the forum itself only the adjoining northwestern corner was laid bare. It also was surrounded by a colonnade, but with smaller columns. The basilica is clearly part of the city of Sebaste built by Herod, having the same masonry and architectural details as the forum and the road of columns. The inscription in Greek on the architrave found in the court-yard mentions the name of Annius Ru[fus], and proves that the building was in existence in his day (ca. 12-15 A.D.). It has been repaired or partially reconstructed at least twice. The latest reconstruction was after 350 A.D. and an earlier and better one was previous to 270 A.D., as is shown by the dates of coins found between the two floors.

The plans of the walls underneath the Herodian basilica could not be fully made out. Their importance therefore lay in the evidence they gave of the existence of different buildings and different periods of construction. One large building of massive construction showed three periods, all apparently Greek. There were also at three points remains of walls on the rock, which appeared to be Israelite. Thus we have at the basilica the same periods as at the summit, with the exception of the Babylonian.

On June 9 two gangs were put at work at the gateway, clearing between the two round towers and about the northern one. The excavations at this point are incomplete, but the present results are important and, as far as they go, conclusive. The Herodian gate is an ornamental, well-built structure just inside the two



towers. The connection with the Herodian structure is established by the masonry, architectural details, and orientation. The axis of the two round towers and the underlying square towers shows that up to Herod's time the roadway from the gate went up the hill. Herod's road of columns follows a gentle ascent around the southern slope of the hill, and the gate under discussion leads straight into this road. Its axis therefore makes an angle of about  $35^\circ$  with that of the older gateway. A roadway paved with rough stones leads steeply up to the floor of the Herodian gate.

The two round towers with the outlying western round tower and the connecting walls belong to a city wall which can be traced around the whole site, giving a length of nearly 4000 metres. According to Josephus, Herod built the great wall of Samaria twenty stadia (or about 4000 metres) in circumference. It would thus appear that the present round towers with connecting walls were built by Herod, probably as the first and most necessary part of his work at Samaria, and the ornamental gate with the road of columns was added later.

As to the restoration of the city by Gabinius referred to by Josephus, it is hardly probable that this was of great importance, since Herod is said to have repopled the city (Joseph. *Wars* ii. 21 2), but there are traces here of a weak system of fortification, such as might be expected as a result of Gabinius's orders.

A Greek gateway of square towers and adjoining circular structure behind, one of the known Greek forms, lies under the Herodian gate. It probably belongs to the city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., and goes back to the early days of the Syro-macedonian colony. The city wall belonging to it is not yet identified.

A huge wall, built partly on rock and partly on Israelite masonry, identical in size and structure with the so-called Babylonian wall at the summit, plunges under the Roman masonry just north of the northern tower. No tower is visible corresponding to this Babylonian wall.

The square Greek tower is built in a square cut in the rock, but it does not fill this cut. At the northern corner of the cut, under the Babylonian and other walls, six huge blocks of stone

are visible, a fragment of a wall of Israelite masonry which completely filled this cut. In other words, the square cut in the rock represents the place occupied by the northern Israelite gateway tower, and, in fact, the place of the northern tower of Omri's gateway. The masonry still in place is of the rough, massive Omri style.

Thus at the gateway we have practically the same periods of construction as on the summit and at the basilica.

### III. HISTORICAL REVIEW

1. *The Herodian City.* The city built by Herod was surrounded by a great wall four kilometres in circumference, at least ten metres in height, and strengthened by round towers at frequent intervals. The wall was 3.25 metres thick, and like the towers was built of heavy bossed stones. The chief gate lay on the site of the earlier gates, on the brow of the steepest part of the western end of the hill, at the top of a winding roadway which is still in use. Inside the strong round towers which defended this entrance, Herod built an ornamental gateway oriented to lead into a magnificent road of columns which led around the southern slope of the hill to the eastern end of the forum. This road consisted of a broad chariot road with a roofed colonnade on each side. The northern wall was broken by a series of deep niches, each the width of the space between two columns, possibly used as shops.

The forum was a large open space about  $100 \times 60$  metres in size, also surrounded by a roofed colonnade. On the west a broad doorway led into a basilica (court of law). Below the forum on the north but inside the city wall the remains of a hippodrome are visible.

On the top of the hill Herod built the great temple to Augustus. This consisted of a stairway, a portico with immense columns, a vestibule and a cella with an inner row of smaller columns. It was surrounded by a great enclosing wall which also served as a terrace wall for the temple-area. Outside the enclosure on several lower terraces are traces of Roman houses oriented parallel to the temple. There are certainly other great public build-

ings in the city of Sebaste, especially in the northwest, between the Herodian wall and the earlier wall.

The date of these buildings is fully established by the great marble statue, by Herodian and Roman coins, the inscription of Annius Rufus, and three Roman stelae, not to mention pottery, lamps, and other small objects.

2. *The Seleucid City.* The Greek city destroyed by John Hyrcanus in 109 B.C., so far as recovered, consists of the gateway, on the old site, the temple under the basilica, and the complex of houses at the summit, which are all private houses, on three streets. The only great public building is that represented by the massive walls under the basilica, which appear to be part of a temple. The bronze statuette of Hercules found in a cistern may be from this temple. On the lower terrace are houses built to suit the abrupt slope, with stairways leading from one level of rooms to another. The dates of the houses rest, aside from their position, on a Greek stela of King Demetrius, an abundance of Seleucid and Ptolemaic coins, household altars, pottery, etc.

3. *The Babylonian City.* The remains of the Babylonian settlement are the most fragmentary of all. The only structure of importance certainly pre-greek and post-israelite is the great wall which runs east and west across the southern slope of the upper summit and appears again running north and south at the gateway. It is a filled wall, both faces of which are built in receding courses of small stones about 50 cm. high. The filling contains a heavy layer of mud plaster level with the top of each facing course. These are the methods of brick masons unfamiliar with the possibilities of stone as a building material. The date of this wall is certainly between 722 B.C., when Sargon destroyed the Israelite city, and 306 B.C., when the struggles between Alexander's generals in Palestine had ended. The masonry seems to point to people fresh from Babylonia. I am inclined to ascribe these walls directly to the colonists settled in Samaria by Sargon and Esarhaddon, and to date them between 720 and 670 B.C.

4. *The Israelite City.* Of the Israelite city we have at present the palace on the summit, the city wall on the edge of the lower terrace, and the western gateway. As indicated by these remains, it lay on the summit and on the more gentle northern slope of

the higher part of the hill. The southern wall appears to run along the top of the steep southern slope down the ridge to the gateway. As might be expected, the palace-castle on the summit is the dominant feature of the city. With the high, sheer castle-walls rising behind the huge city-wall, the hill was impregnable to assault by ancient arms. This unapproachable nest it was from which the Israelites conquered Moab, fought Damascus, and even for a time defied Assyria. Siege after siege by the Damascenes and the Assyrians reduced the garrison to starvation and thus finally to submission, but otherwise no hostile force could break the defence.







Basilica and western edge of the Forum, looking south.





Basilica and western edge of the Forum, looking north, showing massive older walls (Greek) under floor of central court.





Gateway excavation, looking southeast. 2 = Herodian city wall and tower. 3 = Greek.








Gateway excavation, looking southeast.





Looking west on south of summit. 2 = Herodian; 2a = Herodian wall enclosing temple; 3a = Greek walls enclosing Seleucid street; 4 = Babylonian wall; 4a = block of yellow debris left intact among the later walls.







Looking south over Temple and Seleucid houses. 1 = reconstruction of Septimius Severus; 2 = Herodian Temple; 3 = Seleucid house-walls.





Israelite rooms at summit, looking southwest. 1 = Septimius Severus; 2 = Herodian; 3 = Greek; 5 = Ahub; 6 = Omri.





Israelite walls with superimposed Seleucid walls. 3 = Seleucid; 4 = Ahab; 5 = Omri.





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